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RECLAIM THIS! GETTING CREDIT SELLER RIGHTS IN
BANKRUPTCY RIGHT
Lawrence Ponoroff *
INTRODUCTION
The oxymoronically titled Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA" or "2005 amend-
ments")' has received considerable attention since its passage,
and considerably less than all of it is positive.2 By even a neutral
account, the bill is clumsily drafted,' unnecessarily prolix,4 inter-
* Samuel F. Fegtly Chair in Commercial Law, The University of Arizona James E.
Rogers College of Law.
1. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
11 U.S.C.). BAPCPA became fully effective for cases filed on or after October 17, 2005. Id.
§ 1501, 119 Stat. at 216.
2. Professor Mechele Dickerson points out:
Although the bill garnered the support of a substantial number of Democrats
and Republicans in Congress, virtually all bankruptcy and commercial law
professors at all major U.S. law schools (including this author), all major non-
partisan national bankruptcy organizations, and the national organization of
bankruptcy judges argued that the bill was ill-conceived, poorly drafted, and
appeared to benefit only the credit card lobby.
A. Mechele Dickerson, Regulating Bankruptcy: Public Choice, Ideology, & Beyond, 84
WASH. U. L. REV. 1861, 1866 n.29 (2006).
3. See Jean Braucher, The Challenge to the Bench and Bar Presented by the 2005
Bankruptcy Act: Resistance Need Not Be Futile, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 93, 97 ("The problems
with the 2005 Act are breathtaking. There are typos, sloppy choices of words, hanging
paragraphs and inconsistencies."); Ralph Brubaker, Supreme Court Adopts the Forward-
Looking Approach to Projected Disposable Income in Chapter 13, 30 BANKR. L. LErTER 2,
Aug. 2010, available at Westlaw 30 No. 8 BLL 2 ("BAPCPA is a poorly drafted statute.
What's more, Congress knew that it was a poorly drafted statute and was warned repeat-
edly about all of the difficulties that it would pose for the courts .... Congress just did not
care, though, and enacted BAPCPA without attempting to fix even the most glaring draft-
ing gaffes."); John Rao, Testing the Limits of Statutory Construction Doctrines: Decon-
structing the 2005 Bankruptcy Act, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1427, 1427 (2006) ("Most bankruptcy
practitioners, scholars, and courts readily agree on one thing: the 2005 Bankruptcy Act . . .
is poorly drafted."); Henry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out of Nonsense: Represent-
ing Consumers Under the "Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005," 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191, 191-92 (2005) (noting that bankruptcy experts drafted
previous amendments to title 11 and that BAPCPA drafters refused to make technical cor-
rections to the statute); see also In re Donald, 343 B.R. 524, 529 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006)
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nally inconsistent, and annealed in a cauldron of special interest
pressures. The legislative history is scant' and what does exist is
(stating the 2005 law's changes are "confusing, overlapping, and sometimes self-
contradictory" and "introduce new and undefined terms that resemble, but are different
from, established terms that are well understood").
4. Often pointed to as the prime example is the almost impenetrably dense means
test, 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)-(3) (2012), providing for no less than three layers of screening
in Chapter 7 cases: presumed abuse, rebuttal, and totality of the circumstances. Professor
David Gray Carlson, based on his study of the means test's impact, has concluded that the
result of the huge investment of time and effort that goes into the test has, at best, had no
effect, and, arguably, has actually encouraged bankruptcy abuse. David Gray Carlson,
Means Testing: The Failed Bankruptcy Revolution of 2005, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
223, 227 (2007). However, other examples abound, such as the amendment to 11 U.S.C. §
365(b)(1), which prior to BAPCPA, read in relevant part: "[T]he trustee may not assume
such contract or lease unless . . . the trustee cures, or provides adequate assurance that
the trustee will promptly cure, such default." 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(A) (2000), amended by
11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(A) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). To that sentence BAPCPA added the fol-
lowing incomprehensible language:
[O]ther than a default that is a breach of a provision relating to the satisfac-
tion of any provision (other than a penalty rate or penalty provision) relating
to a default arising from any failure to perform nonmonetary obligations un-
der an unexpired lease of real property, if it is impossible for the trustee to
cure such default by performing nonmonetary acts at and after the time of
assumption, except that if such default arises from a failure to operate in ac-
cordance with a nonresidential real property lease, then such default shall be
cured by performance at and after the time of assumption in accordance with
such lease, and pecuniary losses resulting from such default shall be compen-
sated in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph.
Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 328, 119 Stat. 23, 100 (2005). References to the "Code" or the "Bank-
ruptcy Code" herein are to the current law of Bankruptcy as found in Title 11 of the Unit-
ed States Code and amended through Pub. L. No. 112-106, approved April 5, 2012.
5. As one of several examples, consider section 521(i) of the Federal Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2012). Pursuant to section 521(i)(1), if an individual debtor
in a voluntary case under Chapter 7 or 13 fails to file all of the information required under
section 521(a)(1) within forty-five days after the date of the filing of the petition, the case
shall be "automatically dismissed" effective on the forty-sixth day after the date of the fil-
ing of the petition. 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(1) (2012). Section 521(i)(2) then allows any party in
interest to file a motion seeking an order of dismissal-presumably of the case that has
already been automatically dismissed. Id. § 521(i)(2). This raises the prospect that a case
that was automatically dismissed (or should have been) might actually proceed to dis-
charge before the missing mandated information is discovered and acted upon. This
anomaly has led Judge Jay Cristol to express his frustration with "automatic" dismissal in
poetic fashion. See In re Riddle, 344 B.R. 702, 703 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006) (one of the cou-
plets in the poem reads: "How can any person know what the docket does not show?"). The
constitutionality of automatic dismissal has also been questioned. See Gregory Germain,
Due Process in Bankruptcy: Are the New Automatic Dismissal Rules Constitutional?, 13 U.
PA. J. Bus. L. 547, 549 (2011).
The ambiguities and uncertainties created by BAPCPA, moreover, were not limited to
the consumer side of the field. For example, there is a split of authority as to whether sec-
tion 1115 of the Code, added by the 2005 amendments, exempts individual Chapter 11
debtors from the absolute priority rule. For example, see Dill Oil Co. v. Stephens (In re
Stephens), 704 F. 3d 1279, 1281, 1283-85 (10th Cir. 2013), and cases cited therein.
6. Many critics of BAPCPA argued that the credit card industry was the biggest ben-
eficiary of the act. Both Senator Dick Durbin and Representative Jim McDermott suggest-
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less than altogether clear or helpful. Together, these factors have
frequently rendered the traditional judicial function in applica-
tion of the law; namely, ascertaining (or at least beginning by as-
certaining) congressional intent, an exercise in futility.' To say
ed during the floor debates that the bill was bought and paid for by the consumer credit
industry; especially the credit card industry. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S2216 (daily ed.
Mar. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Durbin); 151 CONG. REC. H2084 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005)
(statement of Rep. McDermott).
A case can be made, however, that no lender group fared better under BAPCPA than the
auto lenders, who among other things, were rewarded with a prohibition against modifica-
tion in Chapter 13 if the vehicle in question was acquired for personal use and within two
and a half years of filing (otherwise, within one year). See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(9) (2012);
see also William C. Whitford, A History of the Automobile Lender Provisions of BAPCPA,
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 143, 144 (arguing that automobile lenders are likely to benefit more
than any other group under BAPCPA). In any case, the late Senator Paul Wellstone, the
lone senator to vote against the bill, summed up the view of many in the bankruptcy field
when he offered this comment with respect to an earlier iteration of the bill that eventual-
ly was passed as BAPCPA:
You are hard pressed to find a bankruptcy judge that supports this legisla-
tion. You are hard pressed to find a bankruptcy law professor, a bankruptcy
expert of any kind, anywhere, any place in the U.S.A. that backs this bill.
This bill was written for the lender. It is that simple.
147 CONG. REC. 13,139, 13,140 (2001) (statement of Sen. Wellstone). On the other hand,
Professor Dickerson has offered a thoughtful explanation and critique of BAPCPA that is
much more nuanced and complex than the single industry capture exposition, although
even she concedes the criticality of the role played by the consumer credit lobby. See Dick-
erson, supra note 2, at 1861-63.
7. See DaimlerChrysler Fin. Servs. Americas v. Miller (In re Miller), 570 F.3d 633,
639 (5th Cir. 2009) ("Even if we were to seek guidance on BAPCPA from somewhere out-
side its plain language, we would be stopped by a dearth of plain legislative history.").
8. See Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. J.L. 485, 485-93 (2005) (detailing the leg-
islation's history going back to its original antecedents in the dissent to the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission's 1997 Report); NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N,
BANKRuPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS FINAL REPORT (1997), available at http://govinfo.
library.unt.edulnbrc/reportcont.html.
Generally speaking, there is no question that motivation behind the legislation was to
curb the use of the bankruptcy laws as a form of debt management by people who in fact
could afford to pay all or a substantial portion of their debts. There is, however, very little
specific legislative guidance concerning the intended purpose for and operation of most of
the provisions of BAPCPA themselves, and particularly those relating to business cases.
See Coop v. Frederickson (In re Frederickson), 545 F.3d 652, 656 (8th Cir. 2008); see also
In re McNabb, 326 B.R. 785, 789 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005) ("Legislative history is virtually
useless as an aid to understanding the language and intent of BAPCPA.").
9. Since the mid-1980s, a significant body of literature has developed exploring al-
ternative approaches to statutory interpretation. Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to
the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 256
(1992). On the most traditional account, embraced in innumerable judicial opinions, the
role of courts in applying statutory language is to determine the intent of the legislature.
Under an intentionalist view, the court might consider a wide variety of legislative mate-
rials in order to determine the intent behind the statute as promulgated. See Patricia M.
Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the
1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 301 (1990) (ar-
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the least, it is difficult to discern that which, in all likelihood,
does not and has never existed in a uniform or coherent fashion.'
Nonetheless, since enactment of BAPCPA, courts have labored
gamely to make sense of its provisions, which, in any number of
instances, are inscrutably obscure, and seem to lack any inher-
guing that the court's primary consideration when presented with a statute is to "advance
rather than impede or frustrate the will of Congress"). A narrow variation of intentional-
ism, sometimes referred to as textualism and almost always identified with Justice Scalia,
restricts the search for legislative intent to the law as written. See Antonin Scalia, Com-
mon-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Inter-
preting the Constitution and Laws, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3,
23-25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). On the other end of the intentionalism spectrum is an
approach, sometimes called purposivism, which goes behind inquiry into what the legisla-
ture "had in mind" to determine what the legislature was ultimately seeking to accom-
plish. Purposivism is frequently identified with the Legal Process Movement. See HENRY
M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
In contrast to the standard models of statutory interpretation, which have been dubbed
"archeological" in focus, T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87
MICH. L. REV. 20, 22-25 (1988), is a school of thought closely associated with Professors
Eskridge and Frickey, known as dynamic statutory interpretation. See, e.g., William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987); William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42
STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990). Taking a pragmatic perspective, the adherents of this theory
abandon the backward-looking archeological approach in favor of what has been described
as a "nautical model," Aleinikoff, supra, at 33-36, in which the legislature launches the
ship, but the courts chart the voyage taking into account contemporary needs and consid-
erations. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 73-74 (1990) (sug-
gesting the most important object of statutory interpretation is to attain the best results
for society through practical reasoning). And yet, even the most devout proponents of dy-
namic statutory interpretation acknowledge that when the statutory text is clear, it is by
far the most important consideration and will ordinarily control absent significant changes
in the social and legal order that call for a more evaluative perspective. See, e.g., Daniel A.
Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO L.J. 281, 309 (1989)
("When the statutory command is unclear, [courts may bring] contemporary values to
bear. But when the statutory language and legislative history make the statute's meaning
unmistakable, such 'interpretation' is more in the nature of a partial repeal."); Richard A.
Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Con-
stitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 189 (1986) (explaining that if the meaning of the
statute is clear, judges must obey).
10. I make this assertion in relation to BAPCPA, and the process attending its enact-
ment, and not as a more general commentary on the legislative process that might be tak-
en as subscribing to the public choice theory that legislation is always an incoherent com-
promise and Congress has no mind of its own. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History,
and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 68 (1994); see
generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 88-115 (1991)
(providing a helpful summary of the public choice literature in relation to statutory inter-
pretation). On the other hand, as Judge Learned Hand pointed out over fifty years ago, the
point does remain true that if by legislative "intent" we mean what one person or any
group of people "had in mind," this is inherently unknowable. United States v. Klinger,
199 F.2d 645, 648 (2d Cir. 1952).
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ently clear reason." Thoughtful commentators have undertaken
to offer useful insight and analysis to help guide that effort.12
Overall, however, these efforts have fallen, and will continue to
fall, short in relation to any number of provisions of BAPCPA.
This is because they entail a stoic and estimable, but ultimately
vain, attempt to interpret statutory text that is, in some instanc-
es, impenetrably vague or simply incomplete, or, in other instanc-
es, confounds essential bankruptcy policy. A coherent and intelli-
gible expression of legislative intent that might have shed some
light in the process is nowhere to be found.'3 Although the compe-
tition is unquestionably stiff, in perhaps no substantive area of
the field have these observations been truer than in the efforts to
deconstruct and rationally apply the changes BAPCPA wrought
on an area of commercial law and practice that was already em-
broiled in confusion and controversy; namely, sellers' right of rec-
lamation.
The 2005 amendments to the right of reclamation are a puzzle.
Through no fault of their own, courts have creatively, but unsuc-
cessfully, attempted to untangle the Gordian Knot into which
BAPCPA has tied the right of reclamation (and an ancillary new
remedy for credit sellers of goods) in bankruptcy. 4 This is partly
due to the fact that, at some level, courts simply cannot accept
that the statute means what it says, or, in certain cases, accept
the implications of applying the statute to mean what it says.
Courts, of course, are constrained in their efforts to minimize the
chaos given the fact that, by dint of their structural and institu-
11. See In re Perfetto, 361 B.R. 27, 31 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2007), in which the court mused:
Such incongruous results appear throughout BAPCPA, creating the potential
for many anomalies that were either never considered or completely ignored
by the architects of this law. Left to deal with such issues, but with no guid-
ance provided by the seemingly myopic drafters, courts are and will be re-
quired to fashion common sense approaches to achieve order out of the confu-
sion unwittingly created by Congress.
12. See, e.g., Samuel L. Bufford & Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Problems in the
2005 Bankruptcy Amendments, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (2008); Richard Levin & Alesia Ran-
ney-Marinelli, The Creeping Repeal of Chapter 11: The Significant Business Provisions of
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 603 (2005); A. Thomas Small, If You Fix It, They Will Come-A New Playing Field for
Small Business Bankruptcies, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 981 (2005); Eugene R. Wedoff, Major
Consumer Bankruptcy Effects of BAPCPA, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 31.
13. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
14. That remedy is the new administrative expense priority in § 503(b)(9) for the val-
ue of goods sold to the debtor in the ordinary course of the debtor's business in the twenty-
day period prior to the filing of the case. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9) (2012).
2014]1 737
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
tional responsibilities, they must be honest brokers and play the
hand that the legislature deals them, regardless (continuing the
metaphor) of how rotten the cards." Those of us who comment on
the law, however, are not constrained by the parameters associ-
ated with playing a formal role in the constitutional system of
government, and we do not have to decide real cases between ac-
tual litigants. We have the prerogative and the privilege, there-
fore, to go beyond the positive law and openly (but hopefully con-
structively) critique legislative enactments that either defy
rational interpretation or introduce systemic disharmony into the
larger regime. We have license to ask the "right" questions; and,
in this instance, the right questions about reclamation are: (1)
how does preferential treatment for reclaiming and other sellers
of goods fit within the broader panoply of bankruptcy policies,
separate and apart from the role the doctrine serves under state
law; (2) how well does BAPCPA balance these considerations; and
(3) if poorly, then how can and should credit seller remedies be
crafted in bankruptcy to ensure that the interests of those sellers,
and the various other parties with a stake in the bankruptcy case,
are optimally coordinated and aligned? Those are the questions
this article seeks to raise and begins to answer.
In order to provide the context, Part I begins with an overview
of the right of reclamation under both common law and the Uni-
form Commercial Code ("U.C.C."), and then also in a bankruptcy
proceeding up to circa 2005." Next, Part II chronicles the changes
to the rules governing reclamation and reclamation-type claims
in bankruptcy brought about under BAPCPA, and reviews the
palmary efforts of courts to grapple with some of the key interpre-
tational curiosities that these revisions have spawned. In this
15. The Supreme Court of the United States has been clear that where Congress has
unambiguously drafted a particular provision, it is the court's sole function to enforce it
according to its terms, not to undermine its effect. See Lamie v. United States Tr., 540
U.S. 526, 534-36 (2004). The words of a statute cannot be ignored or jettisoned by courts
looking to impose their own meaning, however logical that meaning, on a statutory
scheme. See, e.g., IUE-CWA v. Visteon Corp. (In re Visteon Corp.), 612 F.3d 210, 219-20
(3d Cir. 2010) (construing the provision of section 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code in accord-
ance with its plain language); see also supra note 9 (outlining different approaches to stat-
utory interpretation and referencing a preference for remaining faithful to the plain lan-
guage of the statue).
16. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, AND NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAws, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: OFFICIAL TEXT AND COMMENTS
(2013).
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connection, this article emphasizes two points: (1) why the pre-
vailing judicial approaches to these kinds of credit seller claims in
bankruptcy are, with a few exceptions, unsupportable under the
terms of the statute as written; and (2) what are the larger, nega-
tive ramifications of such forced and unnatural interpretation.
Finally, Part III sets forth an alternative way of thinking about
and approaching credit seller claims (and the reclamation reme-
dy) in bankruptcy that coheres not simply with what historically
have been the most compelling purposive objects of the right of
reclamation, but also harmonizes the interaction of those objec-
tives with the unique policy considerations that are implicated
once a bankruptcy case is filed.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A. The Common Law
Ordinarily, a credit seller of goods has no special claim to the
goods it sells unless the seller reserves a security interest in those
goods." A limited exception to this axiom existed at common law
(and perhaps even earlier) for a seller who had been defrauded
into delivering goods to an insolvent buyer." Generally speaking,
this right to "reclaim" required a showing that the buyer had mis-
represented its solvency to the selling creditor or, later in the de-
velopment of the right, to a third party (such as a credit reporting
agency) on whose records the selling creditor relied." Even
though title and possession of the goods had passed to the buyer,
in such a case the defrauded seller was entitled effectively to re-
17. The typical remedy in such a case would be an action for the price under U.C.C.
section 2-709, which would, if successful, lead to a judgment and, only then, the ability to
obtain a lien on the debtor's assets by levy and execution. U.C.C. § 2-709 (2013).
18. For a much more complete historical account of the right of reclamation, as well as
an analysis in support of a more or less expanded version of the remedy, see generally Pes-
ter Refining Co. v. Ethyl Corp. (In re Pester Refining Co.), 964 F.2d 842, 844 (8th Cir. 1992)
(stating that reclamation is a rescissory "remedy, based upon the theory that the seller
has been defrauded"); Larry T. Garvin, Credit, Information, and Trust in the Law of Sales:
The Credit Seller's Right of Reclamation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 247 (1996) (detailing the statu-
tory history of reclamation, the U.C.C.'s formulation of the remedy of reclamation, and the
state of reclamation case law at the time).
19. See generally Robert Braucher, Reclamation of Goods from a Fraudulent Buyer, 65
MICH. L. REV. 1281, 1282-83 (1967) (noting that it was generally assumed that insolvency
without fraud or misrepresentation was not a basis for rescission and replevin, although
such fraud could exist if the debtor knew payment was extremely unlikely and failed to
disclose that fact).
2014] 739
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scind the contract and recover the specific goods. In time, the
right might also be triggered in the absence of a misrepresenta-
tion if the acquisition of the goods was part of a premeditated
scheme to defraud, or if it could be shown that the debtor was
hopelessly insolvent at the time of the purchase."o The right to re-
claim the goods subject to the sale, when it existed, generally ex-
tended to indefinable proceeds in the event of resale or, where the
goods were fungible in nature, had become commingled with like
goods."
The only widely recognized exception to the seller's right of rec-
lamation was in cases where title to the goods had passed to a
bona fide purchaser for value before the right to reclaim had been
exercised." In general, however, this protected status was held
not to extend either to a consensual inventory lender or to a levy-
ing creditor of the buyer." In the latter situation, this was true
regardless of whether the credit was extended before or after the
sale giving rise to the reclamation claim, unless the defrauded
seller by its words or conduct had misled the levying creditor into
believing that the buyer was the true owner of the goods.24
Historically, the right to reclaim goods would be forfeited if not
exercised diligently.25 It was not, however, governed, as it later
came to be, by a rigidly truncated period for demand,26 and was
also enforceable even in the event of the buyer's bankruptcy since
20. Id. at 1283 (suggesting, "amid some dispute," substantial authority for this posi-
tion).
21. Garvin, supra note 18, at 257.
22. This was consistent with the long-recognized exception to the common law princi-
ple of nemo dat quod non habet whereby a party with voidable title might nonetheless
pass good title in the market. See Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith
Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1057-60 (1954); see also 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 449 (9th ed. 1783) ("But [title] may also in some cases be transferred by
sale, though the vendor hath none at all in the goods: for it is expedient that the buyer, by
taking proper precautions, may at all events be secure of his purchase; otherwise all com-
merce between man and man must soon be at an end.").
23. See infra note 28.
24. Braucher, supra note 19, at 1283. Professor Garvin also points out that the scope
of this exception was narrower at common law than it came to be under the U.C.C. Garvin,
supra note 18, at 259-60 (noting that the attaching creditor and recipient of new security
for an old debt were not included among those who qualified as a bonafide purchase for
value).
25. See, e.g., Leatherbury v. Connor, 23 A. 684, 685 (N.J. 1892) (stating that sellers
seeking to take advantage of the remedy must proceed with diligence).
26. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
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it was considered to be and treated as a valid pre-bankruptcy in-
terest in the debtor's property to which the trustee took subject."
Thus, at common law, the right of reclamation represented a
powerful remedy not only against the debtor, but also against a
wide variety of other claimants in the goods, including most
claims based on prior consensual liens.28
B. Codification
The notion of affording special rights for sellers of goods who
extended unsecured credit to insolvent buyers did not find its way
into the Uniform Sales Act, though it was assumed to continue as
a matter of suppletory common law." The first codification of the
reclamation remedy occurred in connection with approval and
adoption of Article 2 of the U.C.C." Specifically, U.C.C. section 2-
702(2) allows a credit seller" to reclaim its goods from an insol-
27. See Donaldson v. Farwell, 93 U.S. 631, 633 (1876); see also Frank R. Kennedy, The
Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Problems Suggested by
Articles 2 and 9, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 518, 549-54 (1960) (discussing the right of reclama-
tion with respect to the rights of lien creditors in bankruptcy).
28. Prior to Article 9's broad endorsement of a unitary security device and the "float-
ing lien" over inventory and receivables, chattel security law's concerns over the issue of
ostensible ownership resulted in a very limited ability of inventory lenders to establish
priority over after-acquired property without the necessity for extensive, technical, and
burdensome on-going monitoring and paperwork. The history of how debtors and creditors
overcame the common law's hostility to nonpossessory security interests is well told in 1
GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY (1965). Even after wide-
spread adoption of the U.C.C., some commentators argued it was a "commercial injustice"
for a secured party to be preferred over the reclaiming seller when the secured party's
claim to the goods was based solely on an after-acquired property clause. See, e.g., Law-
rence R. Small, The Remedy Provisions of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A
Practical Orientation, 4 GONZ. L. REV. 176, 189-91 (1969). It is, however, now a well-
accepted principle. See infra text accompanying notes 73 & 118.
29. Richard M. Cieri & Jeffrey B. Ellman, Understanding Reclamation Claims in
Bankruptcy: Hidden Complexity in a Simple Statute, 5 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 531, 533 & n.5
(1996) (reviewing the most common elements of a reclamation claim cited by courts under
U.C.C. section 2-702(2), some of which also required that the buyer still be in possession of
the goods at the time demand is made).
30. For an extensive history of the drafting of the Article 2 reclamation right see
Braucher, supra note 19, at 1285-91.
31. Courts have also created a right of reclamation for cash sellers (such as a case
where payment for goods is made by a check that is later dishonored) out of U.C.C. section
2-507(2) cmt. 3 and U.C.C. section 2-511(3). See In re Helms Veneer Corp., 287 F. Supp.
840, 844-46 (W.D. Va. 1968); In re Mort Co., 208 F. Supp. 309, 310-11 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
However, U.C.C. section 2-403(1) gives voidable title to the cash buyer, meaning that the
buyer, who holds voidable title, has the power to transfer good title to a good faith pur-
chaser for value. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (2013). At common law, and under the Uniform Sales
Act, unpaid cash sellers generally prevailed over the claims of bona fide purchasers, in-
2014] 741
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
vent buyer provided that demand is made within ten days after
receipt of the goods.12 As a practical matter, the statutory ten-day
demand requirement limits the utility of the remedy to only the
most vigilant vendors. However, upon a showing that the buyer
misrepresented solvency in writing within the three months pre-
ceding delivery of the goods," section 2-702(2) eliminates the ten-
day demand condition, thus expanding considerably both the
scope and the impact of the credit seller's potential reclamation
claim in these limited circumstances.3 4
Although codification of credit sellers' reclamation rights has
made the remedy a more self-activating one by eliminating the
need for individual proof of fraud or intent to defraud in every
case where the buyer receives goods on credit while insolvent,
codification has also preempted case law development by limiting
the scope of the right to circumstances where the conditions speci-
fied in the statute have been satisfied." U.C.C. section 2-702(3)
further narrows the remedy by providing that exercise of the rec-
lamation right is in lieu of all other remedies against the goods.
This has meant the loss of the seller's ability to pursue additional
eluding those who took by lien, because title was deemed not to pass to the buyer in a cash
sale transaction until payment had been made. See Richard Arnold, Note, The Cash Sell-
er's Right of Reclamation Versus the Second Party's Floating Lien: Who is Entitled to Prior-
ity?, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 277, 277-78 (1978). For discussion of priority between pur-
chasers and a credit seller's express right of reclamation see infra text accompanying
notes 70-73.
32. U.C.C. § 2-702 (2002). Under Article 2, of course, the rights of sellers and buyers
are not determined by the location of title. U.C.C. § 2-401(1) (2013).
33. For more detailed discussion of the form which such misrepresentation of solvency
might take, see Garvin, supra note 18, at 274-75.
34. According to Official Comment 2 to former U.C.C. section 2-702(2), to fall within
this exception to the "time limitation," the written statement of solvency must be ad-
dressed to the particular seller and "dated within three months of the delivery." U.C.C. §
2-702(2) cmt. 2 (2002).
35. The last sentence of U.C.C. section 2-702(2) expressly provides that a credit seller
may not base a right to reclaim goods except in the manner provided in that subsection.
U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (2013); see also CAM/RPC Elecs. v. Robertson (In re MGS Marketing),
111 B.R. 264, 267 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990) (noting that all equitable and common law reme-
dies are supplanted).
36. U.C.C. § 2-702(3) ("Successful reclamation of goods excludes all other remedies
with respect to them."). Comment 3 to U.C.C. section 2-702 recognizes that the right to
reclaim goods constitutes a preference as against the buyer's other creditors and, there-
fore, exercise of the right bars all other remedies as to the goods involved. U.C.C. § 2-702
cmt. 3; see also In re Ky. Flush Door Corp., 28 B.R. 808, 810 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983) (rec-
ognizing that section 2-702 provides the "sole remedy for a reclaiming seller"); Garvin, su-
pra note 18, at 275 (observing that this contrasts with the more liberal approach taken to
election of remedies for both buyers and nonreclaiming sellers).
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remedies, such as consequential damages or a deficiency judg-
ment. In addition, in the view of several courts, it has also en-
tailed loss of the right that existed at common law to retain a pri-
ority against identifiable proceeds of goods subject to reclamation,
even as against unsecured creditors." Finally, as discussed be-
low," while the right itself finds expression in subsection (2) of
U.C.C. section 2-702 against the buyer as the exclusive source of
reclamation, subsection (3) further limits the breadth of the rec-
lamation right by delineating more broadly-than at common
law-the scope of the seller's right vis-A-vis other parties who
might claim an interest in the goods." This is also where the in-
tersection with bankruptcy law begins.
Until 1966, the official text of U.C.C. section 2-702(3) made the
seller's right to reclaim subject to the claims of both lien creditors
and good faith purchasers. Therefore, not surprisingly, most of
the early litigation in bankruptcy involving assertion of reclama-
tion rights pitted the aggrieved seller against the trustee acting
in her hypothetical lien creditor capacity.40 In 1966, the drafters
of the U.C.C. recommended the elimination of "lien creditors"
from the class of persons to whose rights a reclaiming seller
would be subject under section 2-702(3).41 Upon adoption by the
states, this deletion seriously blunted the trustee's ability to de-
feat reclaiming sellers by resorting to the strong-arm powers.
However, in that same year, Congress promulgated amendments
37. See Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238, 1245 (5th Cir. 1976);
see also infra note 66. The basis of this argument is that U.C.C. section 2-702(2) speaks
only of reclaiming goods, and says nothing of reclaiming proceeds. Of course, even if good
as against unsecured creditors, such a priority would not in any case apply as against a
purchaser or prior lienor because of the express subordination in section 2-702(3). See in-
fra text accompanying notes 70-73. While not altogether clear, it appears that the seller's
right to reclaim fungible goods that have become commingled in a single bulk may contin-
ue under Article 2. See Conoco, Inc. v. Braniff, Inc. (In re Braniff, Inc.), 113 B.R. 745, 754-
55 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); Eighty-Eight Oil Co. v. Charter Crude Oil Co. (In re Charter
Co.), 54 B.R. 91, 93 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985); infra text accompanying note 68.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 70-73.
39. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
40. Compare Johnston & Murphy Shoes, Inc. v. Meinhard Commercial Corp. (In re
Mel Golde Shoes, Inc.), 403 F.2d 658, 660-61 (6th Cir. 1968) (defrauding seller's right to
reclaim goods is superior to any right of attaching creditors under section 70(c) of the for-
mer Bankruptcy Act), with In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir. 1960) (determining
the "strong arm" clause under section 70(c) of the former Bankruptcy Act was successfully
used to defeat reclaiming seller under authority of U.C.C. section 2-702 (3)).
41. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REPORT No. 3,
at 3 (1967).
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to the former Bankruptcy Act that included the new standards
(now incorporated into Bankruptcy Code section 545) for invali-
dating state-created priorities masquerading as statutory liens.4
This immediately created an issue as to whether or not the
U.C.C. section 2-702(2) reclamation right could be avoided as an
offending statutory lien.43
Relying on an expansive definition of the term "lien," and the
fact that effectiveness of the rights conferred by U.C.C. section 2-
702(2) are rather obviously made contingent on the financial sol-
vency of the buyer, some bankruptcy courts reasoned that the
statutory reclamation right represented precisely the kind of
state-created priority that it was the policy of Bankruptcy Act
section 67(c)(1)(A)" (the precursor to Code section 545(1)) to pre-
vent from interfering with the order of distribution in a bank-
ruptcy case.4 5 On the other hand, influenced by the longstanding
equitable and common law antecedents of the Article 2 reclama-
tion right, panels for each of the Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Cir-
cuits analogized U.C.C. section 2-702(2) more to a state-created
right of ownership than to a lien arising "solely by force of stat-
ute."" Therefore, these courts ruled that the trustee was without
42. See Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. Holzman (In re Telemart Enters.), 524 F.2d 761, 764
(9th Cir. 1975) (discussing abuses that led to abolition of state-created priorities in section
67(c) of the former Bankruptcy Act, originally adopted as part of the Chandler Act (Act of
June 22, 1938, ch. 575 § 67(c), 52 Stat. 840, 877) amendments to the former Bankruptcy
Act, and rewritten by Congress in 1966); Act of July 5, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-495, 80 Stat.
268, 268-70 (amending sections 1, 17a, 64a(5), 67(b), 67(c), and 70c of the Bankruptcy Act,
and for other purposes).
43. See, e.g., In re Telemart Enters., 524 F.2d at 763.
44. That provision provided: "(c)(1) The following liens shall be invalid against the
trustee: (A) every statutory lien which first becomes effective upon the insolvency of the
debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(A) (1964 & Supp. II 1967).
45. See, e.g., Queensboro Farm Prods., Inc. v. Wetson's Corp. (In re Wetson's Corp.),
17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 423, 426 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1975) (stating that, like other
liens, because the reclamation right is extinguished upon payment of the debt, it falls
within the definition of a "lien").
46. In re Federal's, Inc., 553 F.2d 509, 516 (6th Cir. 1977) (emphasis omitted) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted); see also Bassett Furniture Indus. v. Wear (In re PFA Farm-
ers Market Ass'n), 583 F.2d 992, 1000 (8th Cir. 1978) (reasoning that the reclamation
right involves the concept of "voidable title" rather than a state priority or a traditional
lien); In re Telemart Enters., 524 F.2d at 765. Note, however, that in In re Wetson's Corp.
the court rejected the argument that section 2-702(2) was the analogue of the common law
right to reclaim since there was no right to reclaim at common law without specific proof
of fraud. 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 426.
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authority under section 67(c)(1)(A) to refuse an otherwise proce-
durally proper reclamation demand."
C. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
In an apparent effort to settle the controversy concerning the
proper characterization of reclamation claims in bankruptcy,48 the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978" contained a new provision that
explicitly precluded the trustee from relying upon certain enu-
merated avoiding powers, including section 545, in order to defeat
the claims of reclaiming sellers."o Bankruptcy Code section 546(c),
as originally adopted," affirmatively stated that the trustee's
rights and powers were subject to a seller's statutory or common
law right to reclaim goods sold to the debtor provided that: (1) the
goods were sold in the ordinary course of the seller's business; (2)
the debtor was insolvent at the time the goods were received; (3)
reclamation was demanded in writing within ten days of such re-
ceipt (twenty days if the ten-day period expired after the com-
mencement of the case); and (4) the goods were in the debtor's
possession at the time the demand was received.52 Placement of
this provision within section 546, titled "Limitations on avoiding
powers," is explicable, and should be understood, in light of the
history described above regarding the uncertain validity of recla-
mation claims under the former Bankruptcy Act."
47. Presumably, if the reclamation right is not a "statutory lien," then neither would
the trustee's status as a bona fide purchaser of property under section 67(c)(1)(B), the pre-
cursor to section 545(2), have been of any greater avail to the trustee than the section
67(1)(A) power to invalidate statutory liens arising upon the debtor's insolvency.
48. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 86-87 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5872-73; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 372 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6328;
see also Pester Ref. Co. v. Ethyl Corp. (In re Pester Ref. Co.), 964 F.2d 842, 845 (8th Cir.
1992) (pointing out that section 546(c) was Congress' response to two decades of litigation
between trustees and reclaiming sellers).
49. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
50. Id. § 546(c), 92 Stat. at 2597. Section 546(c) also, by its original terms, barred a
trustee from using his rights and powers under sections 544(a), 547, or 549 to avoid a rec-
lamation claim which satisfied the requirements of both state and common law, as modi-
fied by section 546(c). Id.
51. When the context requires differentiation, the pre-BAPCPA version of section
546(c) is referred to as "former section 546(c)" and the current version as "revised section
546(c)."
52. In re Child World, Inc., 145 B.R. 5, 7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).
53. Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 546, 92 Stat. at 2597; see supra text accompanying notes 42-
47.
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The requirement of insolvency in section 546(c), unlike the lim-
itations concerning an ordinary course transaction and debtor's
possession at the time demand was received, was already con-
tained, of course, in U.C.C. section 2-702(2). In In re Storage
Technology Corp., however, the court rejected the creditors' ar-
gument that the more expansive U.C.C. definition of insolvency
should apply in construing section 546(c). 4 Instead, though con-
ceding some practical merit in the creditors' contention, the court
ruled that overriding policy considerations nevertheless dictated
that the narrower bankruptcy definition of balance sheet insol-
vency should provide the governing standard. 5 The differences
between the two statutory provisions did not end there. In con-
trast with U.C.C. section 2-702(2), former section 546(c) required
that the demand be in writing and drew no distinction for cases
in which there had been a specific misrepresentation of insolven-
cy by the buyer." Thus, from early on, reclamation in bankruptcy
began to distance itself in key respects from both exercise of the
right under state law and from the original objective of insulating
reclamation claims from the trustee's avoiding powers.
As the discussion above illustrates, because section 546(c) was
more restrictive than U.C.C. section 2-702(2), some creditors
maintained that former section 546(c) should not be interpreted
so as to bar a seller who failed to establish compliance with its
provisions from still attempting to establish entitlement to recov-
ery of the goods solely by virtue of U.C.C. section 2-702(2)." Os-
54. Pike Tool & Grinding v. Storage Tech. Corp. (In re Storage Tech. Corp.), 48 B.R.
862, 864, 866-67 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985); see U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(23) (2013) (defining insol-
vency in the equity sense of being unable to pay debts as they come due in addition to the
traditional balance sheet sense of insolvency).
55. In re Storage Tech. Corp., 48 B.R. at 866-67; accord Eagle Indus. Truck Mfg., Inc.
v. Continental Airlines, Inc. (In re Continental Airlines, Inc.), 125 B.R. 415, 417 (Bankr. D.
Del. 1991) (using balance sheet test of insolvency); Lawrence Pharm., Inc. v. Best Buy
Drugs, Inc. (In re Best Buy Drugs, Inc.), 89 B.R. 997, 998 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988). A con-
trary result, which has been reached in other cases, has been criticized by some commen-
tators. See Ambico, Inc. v. AIC Photo, Inc. (In re AIC Photo, Inc.), 57 B.R. 56, 58-60
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985); Benjamin Weintraub & Alan N. Resnick, From the Bankruptcy
Courts: The Definition of "Insolvent" for Reclamation Purposes-The Bankruptcy Code vs.
the UCC, 19 UCC L.J. 170, 174-75 (1986) ("[Ilt is difficult to justify the use of the UCC
insolvency definition to construe 'insolvent' in Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code when
a different definition of insolvency is contained in the Bankruptcy Code itself.").
56. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 546(c)(1) (2000), with U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (2013).
57. The other main differences between former section 546(c) and the U.C.C. were
that section 546(c) did not waive the ten-day notice requirement if the buyer fraudulently
misrepresents its solvency to the seller, and section 546(c) specified that notice must be in
writing. See, e.g., In re Leeds Bldg. Prods., Inc., 141 B.R. 265, 267 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992)
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tensibly, the argument went that, as a limitation on the trustee's
avoiding powers, section 546(c) should be read only as creating a
"safe harbor" for a reclamation seller who satisfied its require-
ments, and not as detailing a further limitation on the circum-
stances under which a right of reclamation might be recognized in
bankruptcy." Under this construction, while noncompliance with
section 546(c) would concededly entail loss of its impervious
shield against application of the trustee's avoiding powers, auto-
matic disallowance of the reclamation claim would not necessarily
follow. Instead, a seller would retain its pre-bankruptcy interest
in the goods subject to whatever avoidance firepower the trustee
could muster." Given the existence of substantial authority for
the proposition that U.C.C. section 2-702(2) is not a statutory lien
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act predecessor to section
545(1), if this view of the scope of former section 546(c) had been
widely accepted, there is ample reason to believe that numerous
reclamation claims that satisfied state but not federal definitional
standards would have been afforded recognition in a bankruptcy
60case.
This contention, however-that the seller's failure to satisfy
former section 546(c) should not alone serve to relieve the trustee
of the burden of establishing the applicability of one of the speci-
fied avoiding powers, including invalidity under section 545-was
met with little success in the courtroom.6 1 Perhaps the primary
explanation as to why this otherwise plausible argument was
found wanting is that the legislative history of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act rather strongly evinces a congressional recognition of,
(explaining these differences and citing authorities supporting this proposition).
58. See, e.g., Hitachi Denshi Am., Ltd. v. Rozel Indus. (In re Rozel Indus.), 74 B.R.
643, 644-46 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987) (rejecting this argument).
59. In essence, this view would have rendered section 546(c) a nonexclusive, although
self-executing, remedy for a seller seeking to reclaim goods from a debtor. See, e.g., Farm-
ers Rice Milling Co. v. Hawkins (In re Bearhouse, Inc.), 84 B.R. 552, 559-60 (Bankr. W.D.
Ark. 1988) (regarding right to reclamation other than upon strict compliance with section
546(c)).
60. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (explaining the existence of sub-
stantial authority for the proposition that U.C.C. section 2-702(2) is not a statutory lien
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act predecessor to section 545(1)).
61. See United Beef Packers v. Lee (In re A.G.S. Food Sys.), 14 B.R. 27, 28-29 (Bankr.
D.S.C. 1980); see also John P. Finan, Reclamation Sellers and the Bankruptcy Trustee: Ra-
tionality v. the Language of Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, 92 COM. L.J. 329, 334
(1987) (supporting the argument that section 546(c) should not be construed as an exclu-
sive remedy).
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and desire to end the debate and litigation over, the issue of
whether U.C.C. section 2-702(2) was an avoidable statutory lien."
Put in that context, former section 546(c) was reasonably inter-
preted initially as answering that inquiry in the affirmative, but
then carving out a limited exception where the state or common
law reclamation claimant could also show compliance with the
additional substantive requirements enumerated in former sec-
tion 546(c). Accordingly, the overwhelming majority of the courts
that addressed the issue treated former section 546(c) as the sole
and exclusive remedy for a seller seeking to reclaim goods from
the estate of a bankrupt debtor." In so doing, these courts estab-
lished early on that section 546(c) conferred rights independent
of, or certainly at least not wholly coincident with, state law.
Procedurally, an action to reclaim goods from the estate was
treated as a contested matter and, therefore, initially brought be-
fore the bankruptcy court by motion." The burden of proof as to
the affirmative elements of the seller's right to the relief sought,
including the key issues of the debtor's insolvency and timeliness
of the demand, was on the moving party. Additionally, the peti-
tioning seller had to identify the goods remaining in the debtor's
possession as of the time of receipt of the reclamation demand,65
and, if later disposed of, had to be able to trace the proceeds of re-
sale in order to be able to maintain any hope of recovering specific
property from the estate. However, even in jurisdictions that
62. See supra note 48. For a case analyzing that legislative history in the context of
this particular argument see B. Berger Co. v. Contract Interiors, Inc. (In re Contract Interi-
ors, Inc.), 14 B.R. 670, 673-74 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981).
63. See, e.g., Flav-O-Rich, Inc. v. Rawson Food Serv., Inc. (In re Rawson Food Serv.,
Inc.), 846 F.2d 1343, 1346 (11th Cir. 1988); Plastic Distrib. Corp. v. Koro Corp. (In re Koro
Corp.), 20 B.R. 241, 242-43 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1982); In re Leeds Bldg. Prods., Inc., 141 B.R.
265, 267 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992); Fitzgerald Buick, Inc. v. Rea Keech Buick, Inc. (In re Rea
Keech Buick, Inc.), 139 B.R. 625, 628 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992); Chemical-Ways Corp. v. Page
(In re Dynamic Techs. Corp.), 106 B.R. 994, 1004 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989) (stating that sec-
tion 546(c) is the exclusive remedy for vendors to reclaim goods); In re Rozel Indus., 74
B.R. at 646; Allstate Fabricators Corp. v. Flagstaff Foodservice Corp. (In re Flagstaff
Foodservice Corp.), 56 B.R. 899, 908 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Contract Interiors, Inc.,
14 B.R. at 674-75.
64. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001 (excluding from the designation of an adversary pro-
ceeding any proceeding brought to recover or reclaim property in possession of the trustee
under section 554(b) or section 725); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 9013, 9014.
65. Accord In re Rawson Food Serv., Inc., 846 F.2d at 1347; Conoco, Inc. v. Braniff,
Inc. (In re Braniff, Inc.), 113 B.R. 745, 752 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); see United States v.
Westside Bank, 732 F.2d 1258, 1263 (5th Cir. 1984) (reclamation is only valid as to goods
which are identifiable and in the buyer's possession at the time the demand is received).
66. Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Charter Int'l Oil Co., 60 B.R. 854, 856 (M.D. Fla.
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recognized extension of the right of reclamation to proceeds, and
these were few, the rule remained that proceeds from the sale of
goods subject to demand for reclamation, like the goods them-
selves, were not recoverable by the seller if the goods were dis-
posed of before demand was received." Finally, under limited cir-
cumstances, a supplier might be able to reclaim fungible, bulk
goods that had become commingled in a common pool,68 but not
where the goods had become transformed into some other prod-
uct.69
Even when the seller was able to establish all of the elements
of a proper reclamation claim under state law, U.C.C. section 2-
702(3) explicitly made, as it continues to do so, the seller's ability
to reclaim the goods subject to the rights of a buyer in the ordi-
nary course and a good faith purchaser." Under the U.C.C., the
term "purchaser" is defined more broadly than at common law to
include a secured creditor." Therefore, in the case of inventory
goods, for example, the right to reclaim goods under former sec-
tion 546(c), which expressly incorporated "statutory or common-
,,72law, was generally regarded as subordinate to the claim of a
1986) (proceeds directly traceable from sale of goods in buyer's possession when reclama-
tion demand was made may be recoverable under section 546(c)). A large number of deci-
sions, however, held that because U.C.C. section 2-702(2) speaks only of reclaiming goods,
and not of reclaiming proceeds, U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (2013), by extension section 546(c) does
not create a right to reclaim the proceeds from resale of goods otherwise subject to recla-
mation. See, e.g., Collingwood Grain, Inc. v. Coast Trading Co. (In re Coast Trading Co.),
744 F.2d 686, 689-92 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that a seller did not demonstrate a right to
reclaim goods or proceeds, and citing additional authorities supporting this finding).
67. See Jones Oil Co. v. Intercity Oil Co. (In re Intercity Oil Co.), 122 B.R. 358, 360
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1990); Archer Daniels, 60 B.R. at 856; In re Lawrence Paperboard
Corp., 52 B.R. 907, 910 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985).
68. See In re Braniff, 113 B.R. at 754-55 (applying a "first in, first out" theory for allo-
cating fungible, pooled goods among suppliers); see also Garvin, supra note 18, at 257; su-
pra text accompanying note 21.
69. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. (In re Wheeling-
Pittsburgh Steel Corp.), 74 B.R. 656, 660-61 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987).
70. U.C.C. § 2-702(3); see Westside Bank, 732 F.2d at 1260 (stating reclamation can
never be asserted to defeat the interest of protected third parties who acquire from the
defaulting buyer); In re Coast Trading Co., 744 F.2d at 690 (stating sale to a good faith
purchaser cuts off reclamation). The term "buyer in the ordinary course of business" is de-
fined in U.C.C. section 1-201(b)(9) as essentially a retail buyer from a party in the busi-
ness of selling goods of that type. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(9) (2013). The ability of a party with
voidable title to pass good title to a good faith purchaser is recognized in U.C.C. section 2-
403(1). U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (2013).
71. See U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(29), (30) ("purchase" includes taking by lien as well as by
sale); see also supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
72. 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (2000).
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prior security interest in the debtor's inventory (and proceeds)
which, under the terms of an after-acquired property clause, at-
tached and took priority as to the goods as soon as the debtor ac-
quired rights in them.
Because of this limitation, and the absence of any guidance in
former section 546(c), most courts held that the existence of such
a prior secured creditor operated to negate the reclamation right
in a bankruptcy case to the extent of the amount of the prior se-
cured lien.74 These courts reasoned that section 546(c) was in-
tended to preserve, not enhance, the rights of reclaiming sellers,
such that the seller should be entitled to no greater rights in
bankruptcy than it would enjoy under state law.7 ' According to
these courts, then, where the claim of the senior creditor under
U.C.C. section 2-702(3) exceeded the value of the proceeds from
the resale of the goods, the reclamation right would be worthless.
Thus, it was only when either the creditor released its lien on the
goods, or the proceeds from the goods subject to reclamation ex-
ceeded the sum needed to pay the secured creditor in full, that
the subordinated reclaiming seller's claim would attach-but only
to the extent of the remaining assets and that was all7." A handful
of courts went even further and concluded that just the mere ex-
istence of a secured creditor with a lien on the goods (or proceeds)
subject to reclamation extinguished the reclamation claim entire-
73. See, e.g., In re Diversified Food Serv. Distribs., Inc. 130 B.R. 427, 429 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding holder of previously perfected floating lien on inventory has priori-
ty over reclaiming sellers); Pillsbury Co. v. FCX, Inc. (In re FCX, Inc.), 62 B.R. 315, 323
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986); In re Lawrence Paperboard Corp., 52 B.R. 907, 911 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1985). As noted supra note 31, the secured creditor's bona fide purchaser status can
also defeat a "cash seller" of inventory.
74. See, e.g., In re Quality Stores, Inc., 289 B.R. 324, 340 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2003)
("Because the value of the Debtor's collateral is insufficient to satisfy the secured claim of
the Prepetition Lenders, there exists no collateral value to support the Reclamation
Claimants' subordinate rights in the specific inventory consisting of their goods delivered
to the Debtor."); In re Bridge Info. Sys., Inc., 288 B.R. 133, 138 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2001)
(finding reclamation creditor produced no evidence to meet its burden of proof that suffi-
cient proceeds remained from sale of inventory to preserve its state law reclamation rights
against prior perfected secured claim).
75. Pester Ref. Co. v. Ethyl Corp. (In re Pester Ref. Co.), 964 F.2d 842, 847 (8th Cir.
1992).
76. Id. at 848; see also In re Houlihan's Rest., Inc., 286 B.R. 137, 140 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
2002); Mitsubishi Consumer Elecs. Am., Inc. v. Steinberg's, Inc. (In re Steinberg's Inc.),
226 B.R. 8, 12 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1998); In re Leeds Bldg. Prods. Inc., 141 B.R. 265, 269-70
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992) (holding that right to reclaim exists only to the extent that the
right has value outside of bankruptcy); Toshiba Am. Inc. v. Video King of Illinois, Inc. (In
re Video King of Illinois, Inc.), 100 B.R. 1008, 1016-17 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
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ly, regardless of whether the secured creditor was ultimately paid
in full and its lien released as to some or all of the collateral."
On the other end of the spectrum, In re Sunstate Dairy & Food
Products Co. is illustrative of a line of cases that took a very dif-
ferent approach in giving effect in bankruptcy to the restrictions
contained in U.C.C. section 2-702(3).7' These courts held that the
operative wording "subject to" did not mean that the reclamation
right itself was extinguished or scaled back by virtue of the exist-
ence of a superior lien.7 ' Rather, it was only the ability to exercise
the right to the extent of the value of the secured claim that was
cut off and, therefore, the bankruptcy court could not deny the
reclamation claim unless the alternative relief contemplated by
former section 546(c)(2) were granted of either an administrative
expense priority or a substitute lien on other property of the es-
tate." These decisions obviously accorded to the reclaiming seller
a remedy that had no corollary under state law, once more imply-
ing, if not a separate federal remedy, at least a remedy with cer-
77. See In re Shattuc Cable Corp., 138 B.R. 557, 563-64 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) (a sell-
er who is unable to reclaim goods due to the intervening rights of a good faith purchaser
has no right of reclamation that can be asserted in a bankruptcy proceeding); Lavonia
Mfg. Co. v. Emery Corp., 52 B.R. 944, 947 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985); In re Lawrence Paper-
board Corp., 52 BR. at 911-12 (deciding existence of secured creditor extinguishes recla-
mation claim). In In re Arlco, Inc., even though the secured creditor was oversecured, the
court declined to invoke the marshaling in order to preserve some assets for the seller's
reclamation claim after the prior lien had been satisfied. Galey & Lord, Inc. v. Arley Corp.
(In re Arlco, Inc.), 239 B.R. 261, 272-74 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999).
78. Isaly Klondike Co. v. Sunstate Dairy & Food Prods. Co., (In re Sunstate Dairy &
Food Prods. Co.), 145 B.R. 341 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992).
79. Id. at 346; see Am. Saw & Mfg. Co. v. Bosler Supply Grp., (In re Bosler Supply
Grp.), 74 B.R. 250, 254-55 (N.D. Ill. 1987); In re Marko Elecs., Inc., 145 B.R. 25, 29
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992); In re Diversified Food Serv. Distribs., Inc., 130 B.R. 427, 430
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991); In re Roberts Hardware Co., 103 B.R. 396, 399 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.
1988); Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Wathen's Elevators, Inc. (In re Wathen's Elevators,
Inc.), 32 B.R. 912, 923 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983); see also Lisa S. Gretchko, Seller Beware! Is
Your Reclamation Claim as Strong as You Think It Is?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 1, 2003,
at *20, available at Westlaw 22-MAR AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20 (describing this approach as
consistent with the wording of former section 546(c)(2)).
80. In re Bosler Supply Grp., 74 B.R. at 254-55; accord In re Diversified Food Serv.,
130 B.R. at 429-30 (explaining reclaiming sellers entitled to administrative expense prior-
ity, not actual sales proceeds, where goods subject to reclamation claim had been sold by
perfected inventory lien creditor); Pillsbury Co. v. FCX, Inc. (In re FCX, Inc.), 62 B.R. 315,
322 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986); cf. In re Lawrence Paperboard Corp., 52 B.R. at 909-10 (ex-
plaining an administrative expense priority in full amount of reclamation claims would
not be approved as part of negotiated settlement of creditors' reclamation demands where
record was devoid of any evidence to support such claims).
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tain unique federal characteristics." This point portends the de-
bacle that would later arise under BAPCPA."
In any case, regardless of how the existence of a prior secured
claim was conceived in terms of the impact on a reclaiming seller,
the ability of a bankruptcy court generally under former section
546(c)(2) to respond to a proper reclamation claim with compen-
satory relief not involving return of the goods was obviously im-
portant in a Chapter 11 case where retention of goods by the
debtor-in-possession would, in the court's judgment, facilitate the
prospects for eventual rehabilitation.83 In deciding whether to or-
der physical reclamation of the goods or other compensatory re-
lief, courts opined that the debtor's need for the goods had to be
balanced against the seller's need for the immediate cash into
which the goods presumably could be converted if returned. And
yet, due to uncertainty over market conditions or simply for the
sake of convenience, in some cases the reclaiming seller might
have preferred this alternative relief to return of the actual
goods." Ultimately, however, the decision whether to grant a lien
or an administrative priority in lieu of a right to reclaim resided
within the sole discretion of the bankruptcy court, but that was a
state of affairs not long to endure.8 6
II. ENTER BAPCPA
With virtually nothing by way of explanation, section 1227(a) of
BAPCPA amended section 546(c)(1) of the Code to provide that
the rights of a trustee under sections 544(a), 545, 547, and 549
are subject to the rights of a seller of goods to reclaim goods sold
81. See supra text accompanying notes 55, 63.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 112, 115, 134-37.
83. See Pester Ref. Co. v. Ethyl Corp. (In re Pester Ref. Co.), 964 F.2d 842, 847 (8th
Cir. 1992) (noting that the remedial discretion in section 546(c)(2) facilitates reorganiza-
tion and provides flexibility in enforcing superior rights of secured creditors).
84. See, e.g., Eagle Indus. Truck Mfg., Inc. v. Continental Airlines, Inc. (In re Conti-
nental Airlines, Inc.), 125 B.R. 415, 417-18 (Bankr. D. Del. 1991).
85. The risk, on the other hand, in the case of an administrative expense claim would
be if, prior to payment, the debtor converted the case to Chapter 7 and the estate turned
out to be administratively insolvent. See infra note 181.
86. Whether an administrative claim or a substitute lien is granted is within the dis-
cretion of the court. See, e.g., In re Leeds Bldg. Prods., Inc., 141 B.R. 265, 268-69 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1992); Conoco, Inc. v. Braniff, Inc. (In re Braniff, Inc.), 113 B.R. 745, 757 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1990).
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in the ordinary course of business to the debtor if: (1) the debtor,
while insolvent, received these goods not later than forty-five
days prior to the commencement of the case, and (2) written de-
mand for reclamation of the goods is made not later than forty-
five days after receipt of such goods by the debtor or, if the forty-
five-day period expires after the commencement of the case, not
later than twenty days after the commencement of the case." Sec-
tion 1227(b) then added an administrative expense priority, codi-
fied as section 503(b)(9), for the value of any goods received by the
debtor not later than twenty days prior to the commencement of
the bankruptcy case and which were sold to the debtor in the or-
dinary course of the debtor's business." Section 1227(a), contain-
ing the amendments to section 546(c)(1), also eliminated the lan-
guage of former section 546(c)(2) concerning the courts'
discretionary ability to provide substitutional relief, and replaced
it with language making clear that entitlement to the new admin-
istrative expense priority in section 503(b)(9) is not precluded by
the failure of a seller to comply with the notice requirement in re-
vised section 546(c)(1)."
87. BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 1227, 119 Stat. 23, 199-200 (2005). A red-lined ver-
sion of the changes follows:
(c)(1 Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section and in section 507(c). and subject
to the orior rights of a holder of a security interest in such goods or the proceeds thereof,
the rights and powers of a the trustee under sections 544(a), 545, 547, and 549 of-thistitle
are subject to any satory or emmon lav the right of a seller of goods that has sold goods
to the debtor, in the ordinary course of such seller's business, to reclaim such goods if the
debtor has received such goods while insolvent, within 45 days before the date of the com-
mencement of a case under this title, but--() such a seller may not reclaim any such goods
unless such seller demands in writing reclamation of such goods-
(A) before- 1-not later than 45 days after the date of receipt of such goods by the debtor;
or
(B) not later than 20 days after the date of commencement of the case, ifsueh-10 day the
45-day period expires after the commencement of the case., before 20 days afte receipt of
suc goods by the detr and
(2) If a seller of goods fails to provide notice in the manner described in paragraph (1). the
seller still mav assert the rights contained in section 503(1(9),
(2) th eut .may dery reelrntion to, a serwth sne.h a iht of relrnt that has,
503(b) of this title,-
(B) settessuh elaim by a lin
88. § 1227, 119 Stat. at 200.
89. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (2000), with Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 1227, 119 Stat. at
200.
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The totality of these changes is as extraordinary as it is per-
plexing, and the further distancing of section 546(c) from state
law is notable. First, the reference in former section 546(c)(1) to
any "statutory or common-law" right to the goods sold is gone,
raising a legitimate question of whether revised section 546(c)(1)
creates a federal right of reclamation independent from and whol-
ly disassociated from U.C.C. section 2-702(2)."o Next, the period
within which written demand must be made after receipt of the
goods is no longer coincident with state law. Rather, the period
within which a timely demand may be made, and correspondingly
the goods potentially subject to reclamation, is extended exponen-
tially from ten to forty-five days after receipt of the goods." Third,
the fact that demand must be made no later than twenty days af-
ter commencement of the case if the forty-five-day period has not
yet expired as of the time the bankruptcy case is filed creates the
curious oddity that, under the right circumstances, there will be a
shorter demand period when the filing occurs within forty-five
days of the buyer's receipt of the goods.92 Fourth, the case law un-
der former section 546(c) holding that the reclamation claim is
subject to a prior security interest that attaches to the goods is
expressly codified, but the revised version says nothing about the
priority of a reclamation claim vis-i-vis other claimants protected
under U.C.C. section 2-702(3), such as a buyer in the ordinary
course and other bona fide purchasers.9 3 Fifth, the reference in
revised section 546(c) to section 507(c) should probably be to sec-
tion 507(b), dealing with priority inter se among administrative
90. In In re Tucker, Judge Haines mused:
[P]erhaps the amended § 546(c) creates its own reclamation right, rather
than merely validating the right that exists under the U.C.C. This impression
is supported by the fact that the amendment also strikes the reference to 'any
statutory or common law' right to reclaim, and instead simply states that the
trustee's powers are subject to the 'right of a seller' to reclaim.
Davis v. Par Wholesale Auto, Inc. (In re Tucker), 329 B.R. 291, 398 n.8 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
2005).
91. For an alternative explanation for the forty-five-day demand period, see infra text
accompanying notes 150-52.
92. This would be true, for example, where the goods were delivered to the debtor on
March 1, the debtor filed on March 14, but the seller did not learn of the bankruptcy case
until April 5. Although the forty-five-day period has not expired, it is now more than twen-
ty days since the bankruptcy filing, so a reclamation claim would be untimely. Inexplica-
bly, former section 546(c)(1)(B) gave sellers more time, not less, when bankruptcy was filed
during the notice period.
93. See Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 1227, 119 Stat. at 199-200; supra note 74 and accompany-
ing text.
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expense claims under section 507(a)(2). Sixth, the option of the
court under former section 546(c)(2) to provide an administrative
claim or substitute lien in lieu of reclamation of the goods is elim-
inated.
Finally, and perhaps most significant, is the new administra-
tive expense priority in section 503(b)(9) for claims based on the
value of goods received by the debtor within twenty days of the
date of filing.9 4 This priority exists: (1) without proof of the debt-
or's insolvency; (2) without establishing the seller's right to the
goods under state law; and (3) without any direct connection to
the right of reclamation in revised section 546(c), other than the
clarification in new subsection (c)(2) that the claim is not affected
by a failure to give notice under subsection (c)(1). In sum, with
the exception of the issue of whether the reclamation right is su-
perior to a prior secured claim, which was never in much doubt to
begin with, the 2005 amendments to the credit sellers' remedies
did nothing to clear up the unsettled questions under the pre-
revised version of the statute and created several new, vexing is-
sues of both interpretation and policy, as catalogued below."
A. Section 546(c)
1. Reclamation in the Case Law
In the first written opinion of significance interpreting revised
section 546(c), In re Advanced Marketing Services, Inc., the Dela-
ware Bankruptcy Court disappointed open account sellers that
envisioned BAPCPA as ushering in an era of greatly expanded
reclamation rights." The case entailed a request by Simon &
Shuster for: (1) a temporary restraining order enjoining the debt-
or from selling approximately $6 million in goods received from
Simon & Shuster during the forty-five-day period prior to bank-
94. See Michael G. Wilson & Henry P. "Toby" Long III, Section 503(b)(9)s Impact: A
Proposal to Make Chapter 11 Viable Again for Retail Debtors, 30 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20,
57 (2011) ("The burden of satisfying those claims often destroys a debtor's ability to con-
firm a chapter 11 plan that otherwise could permit the company to survive and successful-
ly reorganize.").
95. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (explaining that the issue of whether the
reclamation right is superior to a prior secured claim was not a matter causing great con-
troversy).
96. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Advanced Mktg. Servs., Inc. (In re Advanced Mktg.
Servs., Inc.), 360 B.R. 421, 426 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007).
2014]1 755
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
ruptcy; and (2) segregation of such goods until the reclamation
claim was resolved." Earlier, Simon & Shuster had served the
debtor with a written demand for return of the goods. Simon &
Shuster argued irreparable injury and likelihood of success on the
merits based, inter alia, on the fact that revised section 546(c) no
longer allowed the court to substitute a replacement lien or ad-
ministrative claim for a seller's reclamation right, so that Simon
& Shuster's reclamation claim would be eliminated if the goods
were permitted to be sold." Further, Simon & Shuster main-
tained that there were no prior rights in the goods that took prec-
edence over its reclamation claim since the debtor's pre-filing in-
ventory lender was to be paid off with the proceeds of the debtor's
postpetition financing."
The court denied the motion for a temporary restraining order,
concluding that Simon & Shuster's alleged losses could be com-
pensated in the form of money damages, although the court did
not specifically address how it would be able to offer such substi-
tute relief should it later turn out that the goods were improperly
liquidated by the debtor."oo As for the prior lien rights argument,
however, the court held that because the postpetition debtor-in-
possession financing order provided that the lenders' prepetition
liens would also secure the postpetition financing, and the terms
of the postpetition credit were virtually identical to the prepeti-
tion financing, Simon & Shuster's reclamation claim was subor-
dinate to the senior lenders' interest in the goods. 0' While leaving
many questions unanswered,'0 2 the effect of the holding in Ad-
97. Id. at 424.
98. Id. at 426-28.
99. Id. at 426-27.
100. Id. at 428.
101. Id. at 427. The court specifically distinguished the bankruptcy court holding in In
re Phar-Mor, Inc., 301 B.R. 482, 497-98 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2003), on the basis that in
Phar-Mor, the prior secured lender had already been paid in full from collateral other than
the collateral that was also subject to the seller's reclamation demand. Advanced Mktg.,
360 B.R. at 427.
102. For instance, it was suggested that because the issue in Advanced Marketing came
before the court on motion for a temporary restraining order the court did not, for exam-
ple, consider the seller's possible right to adequate protection or administrative priority for
goods delivered between the twenty-first and forty-fifth day prior to filing that were sub-
ject to reclamation but became, or might become, unavailable because of disposition by the
debtor-in-possession. Eric R. Wilson & Robert L. LeHane, Secured Lenders'Pre- and Post-
Petition Liens Trump Reclamation Rights Under Amended f546(c), 26 AM. BANKR. INST. J.
26, 27 (2007). The authors note that the court's referral to Simon & Shuster's claim as
"worthless" is probably some "indication" of how the court would likely have ruled on the
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vanced Marketing was to disappoint sellers who believed revised
section 546(c) might: (1) entitle them to what amounted to specif-
ic performance of their claim against goods received within forty-
five days of filing, and (2) alter the pre-BAPCPA rules barring re-
claiming creditors from invoking the doctrine of marshaling of as-
sets against a senior lender with a valid lien on both the goods in
question and other collateral.'
Probably the most important post-BAPCPA case to date was
rendered later the same year-In re Dana Corp.'4 Authored by
longtime and highly respected Bankruptcy Judge Burton Lifland,
Dana Corp. involved more than 450 reclamation demands on
goods with an aggregate value in excess of $297 million against
the Chapter 11 debtors, operating as debtors-in-possession.o'0 The
debtors, manufacturers of auto parts, asserted a "prior lien" de-
fense based on a postpetition credit facility secured by all pre-
and postpetition assets of the debtors, and from which the lenders
under the prepetition credit facility, secured by the prepetition
assets, were to be paid.o' If upheld, this defense would render the
reclamation claims valueless since the prepetition debt to be re-
tired with the postpetition credit facility exceeded the value of the
reclamation claims. Relying on In re Phar-Mor, Inc.,' the sellers
argued, as did Simon & Shuster in Advanced Marketing, that be-
cause the prepetition debt had been discharged by a source other
issue. Id. However, even in the case where the goods have value in excess of the lien-
something that was not the case in Advanced Marketing-the elimination by BAPCPA of
the option of the court to grant a substitute lien or administrative expense priority in lieu
of reclamation moots the issue in all likelihood.
103. The Advanced Marketing court noted that Simon & Shuster was essentially call-
ing on the court to apply the doctrine of marshaling, but that the doctrine cannot be in-
voked by unsecured creditors. 360 B.R. at 427 (citing Yenkin-Majestic Paint Corp. v.
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. (In re Pittsburgh-Canfield Corp.), 309 B.R. 277, 291
(B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2004)); see also Galey & Lord, Inc. v. Arley Corp. (In re Arclo, Inc.), 239
B.R. 261, 274-76 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (refusing to order marshaling, as too costly and
time-consuming, to preserve a portion of the reclaiming seller's goods and observing that,
in any case, marshaling requires two secured creditors). But see In re Suwannee Swifty
Stores, Inc., No. 96-60807, 2000 WL 33740259, at *3 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Mar. 20, 2000)
(suggesting, in dicta, that marshaling may be invoked by a nonsecured creditor).
104. 367 B.R. 409 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
105. Id. at 410-11. As in Advanced Marketing, the creditors' claims were based on sales
extending back forty-five days from the date of the commencement of the case. Id. at 414-
15.
106. Id. at 410-11.
107. 301 B.R. 482 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2003).
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than the goods, namely the postpetition financing, the prior lien
against the goods had been extinguished.o' Alternatively, the
sellers argued that BAPCPA created a new federal right of recla-
mation that, presumably, is not subject to authority decided un-
der former section 546(c). 09
As to the first argument, the court acknowledged a split in the
pre-BAPCPA case law on the scope of the prior lien defense, but
found as better-reasoned the authorities holding that if goods
serving as collateral for prepetition debts are used either to satis-
fy that debt or as collateral for the debtor-in-possession financing,
the functional effect is the same; namely, that the goods have
been used to satisfy the prepetition debt."o Because, as noted, in
this case the value of the goods subject to reclamation was less
than the amount secured by the prior lien, that meant that the
reclamation claims were effectively extinguished."'
The court also rejected the alternative argument that Con-
gress, by eliminating the language in former section 546(c) relat-
ing to any "statutory or common law right," was intending to cre-
ate a new federal bankruptcy law right."2 In explaining this
position, Judge Lifland made his case in terms of the structure of
the Code as originally enacted in 1978, pointing to the continued
placement of the reclamation right in the Code section titled
"Limitations on avoiding powers," a section not dedicated to the
creation of new rights."' Beyond that, his rationales supporting
the conclusion that revised section 546(c) creates no federal rights
separate from state law were predicated largely on the inadequa-
cies of the revised statute (and thus the difficulties that would be
associated in parsing the scope of such a new remedy). For exam-
ple, he pointed to the failure of Congress to make a provision for
108. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. at 413; see also, Colin T. Darke, Secured Lenders Ver-
sus Reclaiming Vendors: An Analysis of Sixth Circuit's Phar-Mor Decision, 18 NORTON J.
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 377, 387 (2009).
109. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. at 413.
110. Id. at 418-21 (concluding that the decision of the court in In re Dairy Mart Con-
venience Stores, Inc., 302 B.R. 128 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003), was better-reasoned than Phar-
Mor).
111. Id. at 419. The total secured prepetition debt was approximately $381 million,
whereas the largest single reclamation claim was only about $9.6 million. Id. at 413.
112. Id. at 416 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also supra note 90.
113. In re Dana Corp., at 416-17. The court also relied on the maxim that amendments
to the Bankruptcy Code should not be construed to effect major changes without at least
some discussion in the legislative history. Id. at 417 (citing Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S.
410, 419 (1992)).
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the protection of buyers in the ordinary course and good faith
purchasers."4 Additionally, he noted that revised section 546(c)
refers to the prior rights of a holder of a security interest in the
goods but does not indicate what those rights are, and makes no
provision for the exclusion of goods that are not identifiable or in
the possession of the debtor on the day of demand."5 In both in-
stances, Judge Lifland observed that recourse to state law is nec-
essary to clarify these key aspects governing the scope of the right
of reclamation and, thus, the revised statute should not be read
as doing more than incorporating the right of reclamation as it
exists under state law.116
In a subsequent post-BAPCPA reclamation decision, In re Cir-
cuit City Stores, Inc., the Circuit City debtors, in a jointly-
administered case, sought summary judgment on their omnibus
objections to the reclamation claims of several suppliers of goods
to the various Circuit City debtors made in the ordinary course of
business in the forty-five days preceding the Circuit City Chapter
11 filing."' As in Dana Corp. and Advanced Marketing, the debt-
or-in-possession financing arrangement provided for repayment
of the senior prepetition lender's indebtedness and a continuation
of that prepetition lender's security interest in all existing and af-
ter-acquired assets, including inventory and the proceeds there-
from, in favor of the new lender."' Several months after filing, the
debtors concluded that it would not be possible to rehabilitate the
business, and the court authorized a "going out of business" sale
of all of the debtors' still-operating stores."' Thereafter, the debt-
ors proceeded with the filing of a joint plan of liquidation."0
114. Id. at 417 ("Clearly, Congress could not have intended to permit reclamation of
goods that have been sold to consumers or other good faith purchasers.").
115. Id. at 416. In short, the court concluded that revised section 546(c) could not be
construed to grant an independent federal right of reclamation because it simply fails to
set forth a "coherent comprehensive federal scheme" detailing the contours of such a right.
Id.
116. Id. at 417-18.
117. 441 B.R. 496, 498-99 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2010). As to one of the defendants, the de-
cision was affirmed, sub nom., in Paramount Home Entm't, Inc. v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,
445 B.R. 521 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2010).
118. In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 441 B.R. at 499. The DIP Financing Facility provid-
ed that it was to be secured by substantially all of the debtors' existing and after-acquired
assets and that it was to be used to pay the prepetition secured lenders as well as finance
postpetition operations. Id.
119. Id. at 500.
120. Id.
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The reclamation claims at issue, which in the aggregate ex-
ceeded $10 million, were made pursuant to a "Reclamation Pro-
cedures Order" entered by the court shortly after the filing.121 The
reclamation claimants took no action after their reclamation de-
mands were sent to the debtors under the "Reclamation Proce-
dures Order," other than to file a subsequent claim, on or about
the time the "going out of business" sale order was entered.'
These subsequent claims asserted entitlement either to secured
or priority claim status based on multiple section of the Code, in-
cluding sections 546(c) and 507(a)(2)."' The debtor filed an omni-
bus objection seeking to have all of the claims classified as gen-
eral unsecured, nonpriority claims. 2 4 The court, in granting the
debtors' summary judgment motion, noted the complete absence
under revised section 546(c) of any authority for granting admin-
istrative expense or secured creditor status on account of recla-
mation claims.'2 1 Specifically, the court observed that section 546
is not a remedial statute; rather, "[i]t simply subordinates the
avoiding powers of a trustee [or debtor-in-possession] . . . to the
right of a seller to reclaim its goods under certain conditions.""'
The court further adopted the Dana Corp. view that revised sec-
tion 546(c) did not create a federal right of reclamation independ-
ent of state law.127 Turning to state law, the court then pointed
out that, under U.C.C. section 2-702(2), a seller's right is limited
to a claim for return of the specified goods, and does not give rise
to any of the rights associated with a security interest, including
any claim against the proceeds of the reclamation goods.'2 1
121. Id. The "Reclamation Procedures Order" called for claimants to file reclamation
demands within twenty days following the date of filing, but did not in any fashion alter
the claimant's substantive rights or their ability to prosecute a claim seeking reclamation.
Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 501.
124. Id. at 502.
125. Id. at 504.
126. Id. at 504 & n.14 (footnote omitted). Additionally, the court stated that it "finds
the In re Dana Corporation analysis persuasive and concludes that there still exists no
federal right to reclamation post-BAPCPA." Id. at 505.
127. Id. at 505 ("In order to prevail, Respondents must be able to prove that they have
a valid right of reclamation under state law.").
128. Id. at 510-11 (distinguishing state law on the ground that section 546(c) grants
the reclaiming seller the right only to reclaim the goods, and not the goods "or the pro-
ceeds thereof"); see also supra note 66 (explaining whether goods or proceeds may be re-
claimed under section 546(c)).
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As far as entitlement to administrative expense status, the rec-
lamation claimants urged the court to follow the Sixth Circuit's
Phar-Mor decision, requiring administrative expense priority
when goods subject to the reclamation claim had been sold and
the proceeds used to satisfy the superpriority of the postpetition
lender's lien.'29 As in Dana Corp., the court declined, noting, ini-
tially, that BAPCPA appeared to moot Phar-Mor and similar pre-
2005 cases by restricting any such claims to the terms of the new
section 503(b)(9) administrative priority.' The court continued,
however, that even to the extent such authorities remained rele-
vant, the reclamation claimants' failure in this case to take any
action with respect to their claims, other than initially to assert
them in the response to the "Reclamation Procedures Order," ne-
gated any further argument for relief.''
2. Analysis of the Post-BAPCPA Reclamation Cases
Until 2005, it was defensible to conceptualize bankruptcy as
not creating any independent reclamation rights, but simply rec-
ognizing such rights as existed outside of bankruptcy, subject to
certain additional conditions and limitations, in much the same
way that section 553(a) enforces setoff rights that arise outside of
bankruptcy, with certain exceptions. 3 2 After BAPCPA, it is simp-
ly no longer reasonable to draw that conclusion, even though sev-
eral bankruptcy courts have expressed concern that the practical
129. In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., at 507; Phar-Mor, Inc. v. McKesson Corp. (In re
Phar-Mor, Inc.), 534 F.3d 502, 508 (6th Cir. 2008). See generally Darke, supra note 108
(providing an overview of: (1) bankruptcy financing, (2) reclamation rights, and (3) the
Phar-Mor decision).
130. In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 441 B.R. at 507 (concluding that under the current
version of the statute, administrative expense priority can only be obtained by establish-
ing the criteria that would qualify for an administrative expense under section 503(b)(1) or
section 503(b)(9)).
131. Id. at 507-08. The court surmised that the claimants failure to do so was likely a
product of the fact that they realized it would be pointless in the face of prior blanket liens
on the debtors' assets, including inventory, the existence of which rendered the reclama-
tion claims valueless. Id. at 509 (citing In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. 409, 421 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
132. That provision preserves, but does not create, the right to offset mutual prepeti-
tion debts that exists outside of bankruptcy, but excludes certain claims-such as those
acquired within ninety days of filing for purposes of creating a right to a setoff-and sub-
jects the nonbankruptcy right of setoff to the automatic stay and to the provisions of sec-
tion 363 regarding a debtor-in possession's right to use property that may be subject to a
setoff. See 11 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2012).
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difficulties associated with that determination would be disrup-
'33tive to the fair and efficient administration of bankruptcy cases.
Respectfully, the wheels began to come off the tracks with the
Dana Corp. court's analysis of why revised section 546(c) did not
create an independent federal right of reclamation. Posing the
question in that fashion preordained the outcome based simply on
the orthodoxy that there is no federal commercial law.134 But
whether there is or is not a federal commercial law is largely im-
material in that it is simply no longer possible after BAPCPA to
understand reclamation in bankruptcy as not creating rights oth-
er than (or in addition to) those that exist under state law, if in-
deed it was ever possible to do so.3'' Furthermore, the conclusion
that BAPCPA did not create a separate federal right of reclama-
tion was not necessary to the principal holding in Dana Corp.
(and, for that matter, Advanced Marketing) that the postpetition
credit facility, calling, respectively, for a "roll-up" and a "creeping
roll-up,"3 6 trumped the sellers' reclamation claims.3 1
133. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
134. After the rejection of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), it has been under-
stood that there is no general federal commercial law. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to
declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State whether they be local in
their nature or 'general,' be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts.") (emphasis
added); see also United States v. Stump Home Specialties Mfg., Inc., 905 F.2d 1117, 1119
(7th Cir. 1990) ("[Fjederal courts have neither the time nor the specialized knowledge to
forge a new body of commercial law; by doing so they would simply be adding to the al-
ready excessive complexity of American law."). There has, however, developed special fed-
eral common law in a number of areas of activity, such as banking, labor relations, envi-
ronmental protection, pension plans, and of course bankruptcy, where there is a strong
federal interest. See generally Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of the Columbia Gas
Transmission Corp. v. Columbia Gas Sys. Inc. (In re Columbia Gas Sys.), 997 F.2d 1039,
1054-64 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing when federal common law will control the adjudication
of an issue). Thus, notwithstanding the scruples of federal courts about fashioning a fed-
eral commercial law out of common law cloth, the fact remains that Congress has clearly
granted the federal courts jurisdiction over many a subject matter otherwise unregulated
by federal law, but as to which strong federal interests are implicated. In discussing what
he described as the "interstitial character" of federal legislation in general, Professor Gil-
more cited the former Bankruptcy Act as the "most familiar example" of how state law op-
erates in the background of federal legislation to fill the inevitable gaps in the fabric of
federal statutory law. GILMORE, supra note 28, at 403; see Lawrence Ponoroff, Exemption
Limitations: A Tale of Two Solutions, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221, 222 & nn.6-12 (1997) (cit-
ing examples).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 55, 63, 81.
136. As explained by the court in In re Capmark Fin. Grp., Inc. 438 B.R. 471, 511 n.15
(Bankr. D. Del. 2010), a roll-up most simply is the payment of a pre-petition debt with the
proceeds of a post-petition loan, whereas a "creeping roll-up" is identical to a roll-up except
that the payment of the pre-petition debt occurs over time. In both instances, the postpeti-
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To underscore the point, the specific reference to "statutory or
common law" in former section 546(c) made it tenable to concep-
tualize the statute as simply protecting state law reclamation
claims from avoidance and (as in the past) preserving the state
law right in bankruptcy, subject to certain restrictions."' Under
the revised version of section 546(c), those rights continue to be
limited in some ways, but for the first time are also expanded in
other respects."' That is simply a fact-and if it means, advisedly
or not, that there is now a right to reclaim goods under circum-
stances that would not pertain under state law-well, then that is
simply what it means. Although the congressional intent was not
made explicit, what purpose was to be served by deleting the
phrase "any statutory or common law right of a seller of goods,"
and replacing it with reference to "the right of a seller of goods"
other than to separate, if not divorce, reclamation claims in bank-
ruptcy from reclamation claims under the U.C.C.?140
The Dana Corp. opinion pointed out that the title of section 546
remains "Limitations on avoiding powers" as an indication that it
is not intended to confer any new rights. 4 ' This fact, however, is
largely explicable in historic terms, 4 2 so it would be a mistake to
make too much of it. Moreover, the heading of a section cannot
trump the clear language of the statute,4 1 which now no longer
tion credit is provided by the prepetition lender, so rarely does money actually change
hands. Rather, as a matter of bookkeeping entries, "[tihe pre-petition loan is deemed satis-
fied and the post-petition loan includes the amount of the pre-petition debt." Id. at 511 n.
14.
137. In re Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Advanced Mktg. Servs., Inc. (In re Advanced Mktg.
Servs., Inc.), 360 B.R. 421, 426-28 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007). Both the pre- and post-amended
versions of section 546(c)(1) were understood, implicitly and explicitly, respectively, as in-
corporating the U.C.C. section 2-702(3) rule subjecting the reclamation claim to the holder
of a prior floating lien on lien. Indeed, the court in Dana Corp. predicated its holding
based on agreement with a pre-BAPCPA case. See In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. 409, 419-21
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007); supra text accompanying note 74.
138. Stacey L. Meisel & Lauren Hannon, Decoding the Code: Why the Revisions to Sec-
tion 546(c) Do Not Create a Federal Right of Reclamation for Sellers, 17 NORTON J. BANKR.
L. & PRAC. 217, 219 (2008) (quoting In re Zeta Consumer Prods. Corp., 291 B.R. 336, 350
(Bankr. D. N.J. 2003)).
139. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. at 414-15 (indicating that, under BAPCPA, the right of
reclamation has been expanded in two respects: (1) the pre-filing look-back during which
goods may be subject to reclamation expanded from ten to forty-five days, and (2) the
grace period within which a seller must file notice of reclamation if not filed prior to the
commencement of the bankruptcy case expanded from ten to twenty days).
140. See supra note 87.
141. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. at 416; see supra text accompanying note 113.
142. See supra text accompanying note 42-47, 53.
143. See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
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coincides with the state law notice period and specifically ad-
dresses to what class of other claimants-holders of prior security
interests-the reclaiming seller's right are subject. If we indulge
the pre-BAPCPA conceptualization of reclamation, and assume
that a seller must comply with both state and federal require-
ments in order to reclaim goods, then Congress' expansion of the
period within which demand must occur from ten to forty-five
days was a wholly meaningless and superfluous exercise (except
* * *144possibly in certain rare misrepresentation situations).
By categorical language, the goods potentially subject to recla-
mation under, respectively, U.C.C. section 2-702(2) and revised
section 546(c)(1) are no longer entirely coextensive.145 Most perti-
nent to the analysis, there is undeniably now a longer look-back
period under the Code. Commentators have undertaken to ex-
plain this seeming anomaly, although they start from the premise
that enhancing the state law rights of reclamation claimants
would be intolerable.1 4 ' Granted it would not be pretty, but of the
many recognized theories of statutory interpretation, the "end
justifies the means" is unknown.14 7 Moreover, as a practical mat-
ter, since the effective date of BAPCPA, credit sellers have regu-
larly asserted, and courts have entertained without blushing, rec-
lamation claims for goods received by the debtor within forty-five
days prior to the commencement of the case. 1 48
Nonetheless, the argument proceeds that, to avoid the harmful
results of an expanded reclamation period, revised section
546(c)(1) can (and should) ostensively be read as retaining the
ten-day U.C.C. look-back period. 4 ' This assertion is made despite
the fact that the "10," which previously appeared in the statute,
has been replaced with the "45." The results-oriented explanation
144. Infra text accompanying notes 151-52.
145. Compare U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (2013), with 11 U.S.C. § 546(c)(1) (2012).
146. Meisel & Hannon, supra note 138, at 217, 220.
147. See supra note 9.
148. For example, in both In re Dana Corp. and In re Advanced Marketing Services,
discussed supra Part II.A.1, the reclamation demands for goods received by the debtors
during the forty-five days prior to bankruptcy were denied because of a prior lien, not be-
cause of the absence of a misrepresentation concerning solvency. The Dana court even
acknowledged the expansion of the notice period for all reclamation claims as one of the
changes wrought by BAPCPA. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. 409, 414-15 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2007); see supra text accompanying note 143.
149. Meisel & Hannon, supra note 138, at 226.
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is simply that reference to the ten-day period was superfluous
given that Congress intended the right to be defined by state
law-even though under this view it would have been equally su-
perfluous in 1978 to include the reference to "10," and despite the
fact that BAPCPA also eliminated the prior reference to any right
arising under "statutory or common law.""o And what about the
forty-five day period for giving notice? The explanation continues
that this language was included in order to cure the oversight in
former section 546(c) of not providing an analog to U.C.C. section
2-702(2)'s elimination of the ten-day notice requirement in the
event of written misrepresentation of insolvency within three
months before delivery of the goods."' Thus, the forty-five day
language, it is suggested, identifies an extended look-back period
when the debtor has misrepresented solvency to the seller, and it
is inapplicable in every other situation, where the former ten-day
rule still pertains. That is, Congress decided to expand reclama-
tion rights in the event of a misrepresentation of solvency, just
like under U.C.C. section 2-702(2), but only by forty-five rather
than ninety days. 152 This, it is maintained, is consistent with a
reclamation statute in bankruptcy that adds requirements to
state law, but does not enhance rights.5 1
There are a few problems with this creative but uneasy inter-
pretation of statutory text and congressional intent. First, there
is no reference whatsoever in revised section 546(c)(1) to a sepa-
rate, extended notice period in the event of misrepresentation, a
distinction that also did not exist under the prior version of the
statute. Thus, the language of both the former and revised ver-
sions of section 546(c)(1) refer to a signal period of time within
which demand must be made. The only logical inference from that
fact is that the written demand requirement is unchanged in
150. Id.
151. Id. at 225-27. The authors suggest that support for this position can be found in
the following two articles: Sally S. Neely, How BAPCPA Affects the Rights of Unpaid Prep-
etition Sellers of Goods, ALI-ABA Advanced Program on Chapter 11 Reorganizations 17-
19 (2008) and the Hon. Bruce A. Markell, Changes to Avoiding Powers Brought About by
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Westlaw SL068
ALI-ABA 247 (2005). Meisel & Hannon, supra note 138, at 233 n.53. However, a fairer de-
scription would be to say that Ms. Neely and Judge Markell raise this interpretation as a
possible reading, but do not necessarily endorse it.
152. Meisel & Hannon, supra note 138, at 226-27.
153. Id. at 227.
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purpose and application, other than by the temporal extension of
thirty-five days. Second, and perhaps most obvious, if the intent
was to correct an oversight by providing additional rights in the
event of misrepresentation consistent with state law, why not in-
dicate that intent and then adopt a look-back period coinciding
with state law, as opposed to abstrusely adopting a notice period
that is half as long as the state law period and that replaces the
ten-day demand period that had unquestionably applied in all
cases under the former version of the statute? Finally, the U.C.C.
does not deal with situations involving written misrepresentation
of insolvency by extending the notice period. Rather it waives the
demand requirement in such a case.'"' If Congress was intent on
bringing section 546(c) more into line with U.C.C. section 2-
702(2), it is peculiar that Congress would do so using an ap-
proach-extension of the notice period (although not to the full
three months)-different than the technique used under the state
law being emulated-elimination of the notice period for goods
delivered up to three months prior to the misrepresentation. -'
In short, this proposed construction of section 546(c)(1) defies
all reason. Lack of legislative history should not be regarded as
license to invent a legislative intent irrespective of its consonance
with the plain language of the statute itself. As noted, this is not
a matter of subscribing to one theory of statutory interpretation
over another in situations where the meaning of a legislative ex-
pression is unclear, or where underlying circumstances have
changed in a far-reaching and unanticipated fashion."' Rather, it
is a fact that the only sensible reading of the language of revised
section 546(c)(1) is that a credit seller that otherwise qualifies
under the statute, subject to its limitation for prior liens, may re-
claim goods sold in the ordinary course, received by the debtor in
the forty-five days preceding filing, and still in the debtor's pos-
session."' The fact that the effect of this interpretation is to ele-
154. U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (2013).
155. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
156. See Eskridge, supra note 9, at 1554 (analogizing judges to diplomats, who in ap-
plying ambiguous or outdated communiques to unforeseen circumstances, must exercise
some creativity and discretion, but who, at bottom, are agents in a common enterprise who
must also obey mandates that are clear); see also Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S.
249, 253-54 (1992) ("[Clourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it
means and means in a statute what it says there.").
157. This is certainly how the statute is being interpreted in practice. See, e.g., In re
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 441 B.R. 496, 499 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2010) (seven claimants all
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vate the rights of one class of creditors at the expense of other
more or less similarly positioned creditors does not alter the well-
established principle that "when the statute's language is plain,
the sole function of the courts-at least where the disposition re-
quired by the text is not absurd-is to enforce it according to its
terms."58 In this instance, a construction that vests rights in cer-
tain creditors that do not appertain under state law is trouble-
some and messy,159 but it is not "absurd" nor is it unheard of as a
matter of bankruptcy law.' Likewise, the loss of stability and
filed demands with respect to goods sold to Circuit City in the ordinary course of business
during the forty-five day period preceding the filing); see also supra note 148.
158. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)
(quoting United States v. Ron Pairs Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). It is rather fundamental that when the express language of a stat-
ute is clear, the court should not adopt a different construction, absent clear legislative
intent to the contrary. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (quoting Con-
sumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
159. For an interesting treatment of why the courts' proclivity for avoiding "messy"
constructions is misguided, see Anita S. Krishnakumar, The Anti-Messiness Principle in
Statutory Interpretation, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1465 (2012). The principle articulated by
the Supreme Court of the United States in Butner v. United States-that a creditor's
rights, entitlements, and priority in assets of the bankruptcy estate are determined under
state law-casts a long shadow over federal bankruptcy law. 440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1979).
But the shadow is a dappled one, because, as Professor Moringiello has pointed out, it is
often overlooked that the Court qualified its statement with the perambulatory language
"[u]nless some federal interest requires a different result." Juliet A Moringiello, (Mis)use
of State Law in Bankruptcy: The Hanging Paragraph Story, 2012 WIs. L. REV. 963, 987
(quoting Butner, 440 U.S. at 55); see also Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451
U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (federal common law can exist when necessary to protect a uniquely
federal interest). Further, the Butner argument ignores the fact that, at most, the decision
constrains judges from ignoring (or altering) state property law rights even if the judge
believes that federal bankruptcy policy augurs for a different result. It does not prevent
Congress, in the exercise of its constitutional authority to enact uniform laws on the sub-
ject of bankruptcies, from limiting state law rights and remedies (as section 502(b)(6) does
with respect to long-term claims of lessors), or expanding on those rights and remedies (as
revised section 546(c) seems clearly to do). See In re White Plains Dev. Corp., 137 B.R. 139,
141-42 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992). That Congress should have paid closer attention to the
rationales offered by the Court in Butner of reducing uncertainty, discouraging forum
shopping, and preventing a windfall in favor of one party over the other based purely on
the fortuity of bankruptcy, is fair criticism, but it does not negate the primacy of the Code,
when demanded, over state law. Butner, 440 U.S. at 55 (quoting Lewis v. Mfrs. Nat'l
Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)); see also United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674,
676 (2d Cir. 1966) (finding the defendant's suggestion to look to the Uniform Commercial
Code as a source for the "federal" law of sales persuasive); see also infra note 265.
160. For example, section 1322(b)(2) of the Code has always afforded favored treatment
to claims secured by the debtor's residence in order to "encourage the flow of capital into
the home lending market." Nobelman v. Am. Say. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring). Likewise, with the exception of section 507(b)(2), all of the categories
of priority claims in section 507 reflect policy considerations that Congress deemed to
trump the all-important equality principle in bankruptcy. See Sampsell v. Imperial Paper
& Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 219 (1941) ("The power of the bankruptcy court to subordi-
nate claims or to adjudicate equities arising out of the relationship between the several
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predictability in commercial transactions that would exist until
such time as the bankruptcy courts developed a coherent and
consistent jurisprudence under the admittedly less than fully
comprehensive and comprehensible scheme in revised section
546(c) is not grounds to ignore what the statute commands. 161
In Dana Corp., the court stressed that revised section 546(c)
expressly subordinates the seller's reclamation remedy to the
rights of a holder of a prior security interest in such goods.'6 2 As
noted earlier, that represents a codification of the practice gener-
ally followed under former section 546(c).16 ' The court went on to
observe that the 2005 amendments do not similarly address the
other two classes of claimants who, under state law, take the
goods free of the rights of a reclaiming seller, and which it equally
had been the practice under former section 546(c) to recognize as
having rights superior to those of a reclaiming sellers.'6 4 The court
then mused that "[i]f amended 546(c) created an independent fed-
eral reclamation right that replaced state law, then in bankrupt-
cy a reclaiming seller would conceivably have broad rights supe-
rior to those of buyers in the ordinary course of business, lien
creditors or good faith purchasers other than a holder of a prior
security interest."' 65 Although that may be so, it is not entirely
clear this must be true. Just because revised section 546(c) cre-
ates new rights, does not necessarily mean that it must be con-
strued as replacing state law.
creditors is complete."). The requirements under section 365(b)(1)(A) and section
1124(b)(2) for, respectively, curing a prepetition default in order to assume an executor
contract or unexpired lease, and avoid impairment of a class of claims, also result in an
elevation in priority for what would otherwise be general unsecured claims. See Moringiel-
lo, supra note 159, at 988 (urging that federal concerns overcome the presumption that
state law defines property rights where remedies are concerned); infra note 190.
161. Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial Law-
making in a Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 81 (2006) ("Bankruptcy is about how
to divide efficiently and fairly a fund that is too small to satisfy all claimants. Satisfying
multiple claimants from a limited fund always involves balancing the interests of the
claimants, as well as the debtor in Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 cases. Such balancing can-
not always be done robotically according to the Code's formulas.") (internal footnotes omit-
ted); see also infra note 265.
162. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. 409, 417 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
163. See supra note 74.
164. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. at 416. Under former section 546(c), the limitations on
the right of reclamation contained in U.C.C. section 2-702(3) were routinely applied. See
supra note 39 and accompanying text.
165. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. at 417.
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In light of the fact that former section 546(c) was more restric-
tive than U.C.C. section 2-702(2),"' it was certainly possible that
a seller might have a valid state law reclamation right that was
not protected or preserved in bankruptcy.167 It now may be the
case that the expanded reclamation rights under revised section
546(c) complement rather than abrogate or replace state law.
This could mean that the two classes of claimants identified in
U.C.C. section 2-702(3), but excluded from revised section 546(c),
remain protected by virtue of the continued incorporation of the
U.C.C reclamation rules in bankruptcy. Under this view, revised
section 546(c) continues to limit state law reclamation rights in
certain respects as it always has, but now expands them in other
particulars, such as through the adoption of a demand period that
extends well beyond the state law time period for making de-
mand.
Alternatively, and perhaps more realistically, given that the
practice under former section 546(c) had been to treat reclama-
tion claims as subject to the several classes of purchasers identi-
fied in U.C.C. section 2-702(3), it would not be by any stretch il-
logical to assume that Congress, by expressly recognizing only
one class of such claimants, did (knowingly or not) elevate the
rights of reclaiming sellers above those of buyers in the ordinary
course and other good faith purchasers."' Whether it was good
public policy to do so is another question entirely, as the applica-
tion of this construction would present some disquieting results to
say the least.'69 This would not, however, be the only case of bor-
166. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57.
167. See, e.g., Barry v. Shrader Holding Co., Inc. (In re M.P.G., Inc.), 222 B.R. 862, 864-
65 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1998) (holding that a seller's oral demand for return of goods, while
adequate under state law, did not satisfy section 546(c), and thus deprived the seller of its
protection).
168. In fact, that is probably the most plausible construction under a slight variation of
the interpretive maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius; that is, the presumption
that Congress acts intentionally and purposely when it includes particular language in
one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same statute. See, e.g., BFP v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537 (1994). Here, the disparate inclusion and exclu-
sion are not in different sections of the same act, but in the same section of the Code in its
pre- and post-amended versions.
169. Among these results would be the ability of an inventory supplier to a debtor-
hardware store to recover a hammer sold to a consumer in a garden variety retail transac-
tion a couple of weeks prior to filing, although, as a practical matter, that would likely
never occur. More realistic might be the sale of substantially all of the goods to a bona fide
purchaser for value.
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der-line nonsensical results accomplished by BAPCPA.o7 1 More to
the point, and as discussed more fully below,' 7 softening the im-
pact of the non-sequiturs through stretched and tortured inter-
pretation not only distorts the legislative and judicial roles, it also
has the unintended effect of serving as a kind of anodyne to the
worst injuries inflicted by BAPCPA.172 This bandaging over and
numbing of the wound, while of some short-term comfort, is inim-
ical in its potential for forestalling administration of the only real
cure: corrective legislation.
Generally, we know BAPCPA was motivated by intent to curb
what was perceived as widespread debtor abuses, particularly in
consumer cases,173 and to corral judicial discretion.174 It is also be-
yond cavil that certain groups were intended to gain advantage in
bankruptcy cases, and it seems credit sellers of goods on the eve
of bankruptcy, along with auto lenders and credit card issuers,
were among them. 7 1 In each case, the consequences have implica-
170. In addressing whether the "ride-through" method for dealing with a secured claim
was still an option after BAPCPA, one court lamented:
Unfortunately, the BAPCPA amendments do not provide a clear answer. The
amendments are confusing, overlapping, and sometimes self-contradictory.
They introduce new and undefined terms that resemble, but are different
from, established terms that are well understood. Furthermore, the new pro-
visions address some situations that are unlikely to arise. Deciphering this
puzzle is like trying to solve a Rubik's Cube that arrived with a manufactur-
er's defect.
In re Donald, 343 B.R. 524, 529 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006); see also supra notes 3, 5.
171. See infra Part III.
172. In In re Nance, the court acknowledged that "adoption of the strict, mechanical
approach" for calculating a debtor's "disposable income" as required by amendments to
Chapter 13 may lead to "impractical results," but observed that such impractical results
do not render the statute "absurd." 371 B.R. 358, 367 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2007). More to the
point, the court stated that it would "not override the definition and process for calculating
disposable income as being absurd simply because it leads to results that are not aligned
with the old law." Id. (quoting In re Alexander, 344 B.R. 742, 747 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006))
(internal quotation marks omitted). "Unintended, impractical results are for Congress to
address by amending the statute." Id.
173. H.R. REP. No. 109-31, at 2-5 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 88-92.
174. See generally In re Nance, 371 B.R. at 366 (noting that one of the major goals of
BAPCPA was to replace judicial discretion with specific statutory standards and formu-
lae); Kara J. Bruce, Rehabilitating Bankruptcy Reform, 13 NEV. L.J. 174, 191-93 (2012)
(analyzing BAPCPA's shift from "standards to rules"); Lauren E. Tribble, Judicial Discre-
tion and the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention Act, 57 DUKE L.J. 789, 791-92 (2007).
175. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. It bears reiterating that while the indus-
try capture account of BAPCPA tells an important part of the story, the legislation also
advanced the interests of a number of other groups, including the holders of domestic sup-
port obligations, retirees, veterans, and, in a few instances, even consumers. See, e.g., 11
U.S.C. § 527 (2012) (evidencing actual consumer oriented protection through enhanced
disclosure requirements). See generally Dickerson, supra note 2, at 1902-05 (identifying
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tions for inter-creditor, as well as debtor-creditor, relationships,
and inevitably entail a recalibration of the balance that must al-
ways occur among competing policies and interests in a bank-
ruptcy case. The replacement of former section 546(c)(2) with its
current language is certainly consistent with a desire to restrict
judicial discretion. Likewise, the expansion of former section
546(c)(1), as well as the adoption of the new administrative ex-
pense priority in section 503(b)(9), are consonant with the intent
to advance and favor certain creditor interests. Thus, in many re-
spects, the new treatment of credit seller claims aligns neatly
with the broad themes that animated BAPCPA from the start. It
is conceded that these objectives may have been accomplished at
too high a cost in terms of erosion of other long-standing, funda-
mental bankruptcy policies. They may also have been achieved in
a clumsy manner and one that will require considerable time to
sort out through the traditional case-by-case development. But
that does not mean that the statute cannot mean what it says
and, for the most part, what it says quite clearly.'
Since promulgation of the U.C.C., reclamation has not repre-
sented a terribly powerful or significant remedy for vendors.'
The combination of a short window within which to make de-
mand, coupled with subordination to other claimants even when
the vendor is sufficiently aware and diligent so as to make a time-
ly and proper reclamation demand, operates to make successful
state law reclamation claims more the exception than the rule.
Prior to BAPCPA, the same sentiment could be expressed regard-
ing the reclamation remedy in bankruptcy.7 8 Indeed, the more-or-
less routine granting (at least until recently) of critical vendor or-
ders represented a much more practical remedy for sellers of
the interests of several groups, beyond the consumer credit industry, whose interests were
taken into account in the crafting of the legislation).
176. This is reinforced by the fact that a bill sponsored by Representative Nadler to
repeal section 503(b)(9) and restore section 546(c) to its pre-BAPCPA form died in commit-
tee. Business Reorganization and Job Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 1942, 111th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2009).
177. See, e.g., Chemical-Ways Corp. v. Page (In re Dynamic Techs. Corp.), 106 B.R. 994,
1004 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989) ("Section 546(c) is the exclusive remedy available to vendors
who are attempting to reclaim their goods.").
178. Crown Quilt Corp. v. HRT Indus., Inc. (In re HRT Indus., Inc.), 29 B.R. 861, 862
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (commenting that seldom is property actually reclaimed in a reor-
ganization case in lieu of other available relief); cf. supra notes 78-81 and accompanying
text (regarding the pre-BAPCPA alternative relief provided in some cases to reclaiming
sellers who were unable to reach the goods subject to the claim).
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goods than reclamation, unburdened as it was (and still is) by the
intricacies of section 546(c) in both its current and original
form.17 1 In any event, with BAPCPA, Congress seems to have
swung the pendulum in the other direction by adopting a nearly
unqualified administrative expense priority for sellers whose
claims arise within twenty days of filing,"'o and amending section
546(c) to permit, subject to certain conditions and limitations,
what appears to be a right to reclaim goods received by the debtor
between twenty-one and forty-five days prior to the commence-
ment of the case.'"' This may represent bad policy judgment in
terms of larger system goals, but that does not mean that the leg-
islative commands represent an indecipherable enigma that con-
sequentially frees us to search for alternative meaning wherever
it can be most conveniently and expediently found. Rather, the
179. In In re KMart Corp., Judge Easterbrook decided that bankruptcy courts' more-or-
less routine granting of critical vendor orders under the doctrine of "necessity" was not
justified under their section 105 or section 364 powers. 359 F.3d 866, 871-72 (7th Cir.
2004). The court left open the possibility of granting a request to pay prepetition debt of
critical vendors under section 363(b)(1), but only when the debtor is able to "prove, and not
just allege, two things: that, but for immediate full payment, vendors would cease dealing;
and that the business will gain enough from continued transactions with the favored ven-
dors to provide some residual benefit to the remaining, disfavored creditors, or at least
leave them no worse off." Id. at 868, 872-73; see also Alan N. Resnick, The Future of the
Doctrine of Necessity and Critical-Vendor Payments in Chapter 11 Cases, 47 B.C. L. REV.
183, 203 (2005).
180. It has actually been suggested that section 503(b)(9) was intended by Congress to
be a response to the ad hoc nature of critical vendor orders, and perhaps as well to the
Seventh Circuit's decision in KMart, but the argument is far-fetched. See Mark A.
McDermott, Critical Vendor and Related Orders: Kmart and the Bankruptcy Abuse Pre-
vention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 409, 426-27
(2006) (arguing for continuation of critical vendor payments even after BAPCPA); Brendan
M. Gage, Note, Should Congress Repeal Bankruptcy Code Section 503(b)(9)?, 19 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 215, 229-32 (2011) (observing that if Congress' goal was to eliminate
the need for critical vendor orders with section 503(b)(9), it failed to achieve that goal). On
the other hand, it was predicted, and has apparently been the case, that the 2005 changes
to the Code have, along with other factors, dramatically reduced the need for critical ven-
dor orders. See Douglas G. Baird, Essay: Bankruptcy from Olympus, 77 U. CHI. L. REV.
959, 965 & n.25 (2010) (stating priority afforded by section 503(b)(9) "is usually enough to
keep [vendors] sufficiently happy that a critical-vendor order is not necessary"); Lauren C.
Cohen, The Application of Section 502(d) to Section 503(b)(9) Claims-"You Can Put Lip-
stick on a Pig," 18 NORTON J. BANKR. L & PRAc. 259, 262 (2009) ("One of the effects of the
implementation of section 503(b)(9) has seemingly been a decrease in 'critical vendor' first-
day motions, which have apparently been replaced with '503(b)(9) motions."); see also In re
News Publ'g Co., 488 B.R. 241, 244-46 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2013) (denying the debtor's mo-
tion for authorization to pay prepetition claims of alleged "critical vendors" on the basis of
failure to satisfy KMart's "stringent" test).
181. Of course, the right to reclaim extends to goods that might also make up a section
503(b)(9) administrative claim, but it is the rare case where that alternative would be at-
tractive to a vendor given the relative simplicity of a claim under section 503(b)(9).
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revised treatment for twenty- and forty-five-day credit seller
claims is easily explicable as a by-product of the legislative pro-
cess, which, on each occasion when it occurs, involves moving the
normative fulcrum in one direction or the other in the ultimate
accommodation of various constituents with a cognizable interest
in the process. Sometimes we applaud the change and in other in-
stances not, but we cannot responsibly ignore it.1'
B. Section 503(b)(9)
1. The Twenty-Day Claims in the Case Law
BAPCPA's incorporation into the Code of an administrative ex-
pense priority for twenty-day claims is a game changer for credit
sellers eligible to assert rights thereunder. It effectively elevates
what previously would have been a run-of-the-mill general unse-
cured claim into a priority payment that must be paid in full un-
less the estate is administratively insolvent.' This invests sec-
tion 503(b)(9) claimants, individually and as a class, with
enormous leverage over the viability of reorganization.'8 4 More-
182. In In re Miller, the court held that, "[a]lthough we have no reason to pass judg-
ment on the process by which BAPCPA became law, we note that perceived poor drafting
should not be regarded as a license to invalidate plain-text readings in the name of fixing
a statute that some believe is broken." DaimlerChrysler Fin. Servs. v. Miller (In re Miller),
570 F.3d. 633, 639 (5th Cir. 2009). The court in Miller also rejected the "[e]quity of the
statute" theory as "essentially [being] a 'dead letter' from the beginning of the twentieth
century." Id. The "equity of the statute" approach, grounded in ancient common law doc-
trine, reflects a challenge to the new textualism in statutory interpretation and reflects a
strong purposivist view. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 22-27 (2001); supra note 9.
183. See In re Plastech Engineered Prods., Inc., 394 B.R. 147, 151 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
2008) (noting that, unless otherwise agreed, the holder of an allowed administrative ex-
pense claim must receive cash equal to the amount of the claim as of the plan effective
date); see also In re Bashas' Inc., 437 B.R. 874, 895 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2010) (approving pay-
ment of roughly $30 million of section 503(b)(9) claims on the plan effective date). It is also
quite possible under section 503(b)(9) that, on motion of the creditor, payment might occur
at any point in time prior to the effective date of the plan. See In re Bookbinders' Rest.,
Inc., No. 06-12302ELF, 2006 WL 3858020, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2006) (holding
that the timing on payment of an administrative expense allowed under section 503(b)(9)
resides within the discretion of the court).
184. Particularly in situations where the debtor is a large retailer, section 503(b)(9)
provides credit sellers with enormous leverage in Chapter 11 cases. Gage, supra note 180,
at 217-18 (stating that, for restaurants and retailers with high inventory turnover, twen-
ty-day claims have presented an "insurmountable hurdle to a successful non-liquidation
reorganization"); see also Bruce, supra note 174, at 199 (noting that the prospects of an
immediate cash recovery through "quick liquidation may overshadow the creditor's inter-
est in supporting the reorganization" of the debtor). For an example of a case where sec-
2014]1 773
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
over, because administrative expenses have always been under-
stood as relating to postpetition expenditures critical to the
preservation of the estate, the new priority for prepetition debts
arising out of the ordinary course of sale, and delivery to the
debtor, of goods on the eve of bankruptcy has also required bank-
ruptcy professionals to change the way in which they tend to
think about what constitutes an administrative expense."'
Once more, the absence of any legislative guidance has led (and
permitted) courts and commentators to speculate on the purpose
for this special priority."' It also left courts that desire to make
sense out of the most disturbing consequences of the new provi-
sions without much to work with in seeking feasible answers to a
number of questions concerning the scope and availability of the
priority, as well as the relationship between section 503(b)(9) and
section 546(c)."' The leading treatise in the field pronounces that
the rationale for affording administrative priority to twenty-day
claimants was intended to prevent a debtor, knowing it would not
be able to pay for them, from loading up on goods that the debtor
anticipates will be useful in the imminent bankruptcy case.8
Others are less sure of this explanation, and a variety of alterna-
tive theories have been offered,' most prominent and compelling
among them being the hope that, in some cases, bankruptcy
tion 503(b)(9) claims contributed to the conclusion that reorganization was not feasible,
see In re Souza, No. 12-13341, 2012 WL 8441318, at *6 & n.1, *9 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Nov.
26, 2012).
185. Section 503(b) accords a second priority under section 507(a)(2) for claims entitled
to administrative expense priority under section 503(b). 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2) (2012). Sec-
tion 503(b)(1)(A) refers to the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate.
Id. § 503(b) (2012). The non-exhaustive list of administrative expense claims in the re-
mainder of the subsections of 503(b) all pertain to obligations arising either in connection
with the filing of a petition or postpetition, except for section 503(b)(9). Id.
186. See Gage, supra note 180, at 229 (identifying as the four most popular theories:
"(1) the critical vendor order replacement theory; (2) the continued dealings theory; (3) the
stockpiling theory; and (4) the reclamation fortification theory.").
187. See id. at 228, 234-36 (noting that "[t]he legislative history on section 503(b)(9) is
virtually nonexistent" and discussing the scope and practical realities of section 546(c) in
conjunction with section 503(b)(9)).
188. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY 503.16[2], p.503-79 (15th ed., rev. 2009). It is,
however, curious if this was truly the rationale for section 503(b)(9), why the focus is on
goods delivered in the ordinary course of the debtor's business, as opposed to the ordinary
course of the seller's business. By definition, a last minute stockpiling of goods prior to fil-
ing is not in the ordinary course of the debtor's business. This is part of the reason why the
continued dealings explanation of section 503(b)(9) seems the more compelling one. See
infra note 269 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 186.
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might be avoided entirely by encouraging vendors to continue to
do business with the financially beleaguered debtor.' This lack of
clarity and agreement over underlying purposive design for
BAPCPA's revisions relating to credit seller claims has only made
things that much more challenging for courts searching for prin-
cipled ways to mitigate what they regard as the most damaging
results emanating from application of the statutory text.
Among the elucidative questions that have emerged in relation
to section 503(b)(9),"' the most germane for present purposes are
those that deal with the interaction vel non between the new ad-
ministrative expense claim and section 546(c) reclamation
claims.'92 Some courts have perceived the two provisions as oper-
ating in tandem, which is pragmatically sensible, but without any
textual support in, and arguably even contrary to, the legislation
itself."' For example, in In re Momenta, Inc., the seller-creditor
filed a motion seeking allowance of a $163,527.95 administrative
expense claim for shipments of goods made within twenty days of
the petition under six different invoices. 9 4 The debtor did not dis-
190. This policy is reflected in other areas of the Code as well, including several of the
preference exceptions in section 547(c), the section 502(f) priority for gap claims in invol-
untary cases, and the administrative expense priorities in section 503(b)(1)(A). 11 U.S.C.
§§ 502, 503, 547 (2012). In each case, bankruptcy equality policy is sacrificed to a certain
extent in order to advance this goal. Id.; see also supra note 160. With the decline in effec-
tiveness of the reclamation remedy to recover inventory shipped just prior to bankruptcy,
the section 503(b)(9) priority has served as a counterweight against the imposition of re-
strictive credit terms (or the withdrawal altogether of credit) for distressed debtors. See,
e.g., AMERICAN BANKR. INST. COMM'N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11 (May 21,
2013) (testimony of Paul Calahan), available at http://commission.abi.org/sites/default/
files/statements/21may2013/PaulCalahanTestimony.pdf.
191. Several of these issues were identified by Judge Lifland in In re Dana Corp., 367
B.R. 409, 411-12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). An even more comprehensive catalogue of issues
arising under section 503(b)(9) can be found in Paul R. Hage & Patrick R. Mohan, Recent
Developments in Section 503-Administrative Expenses, 2012 NORTON ANN. SURv. BANKR.
L. 785, 823 (2012), where the authors state that "[iun the seven years since section
503(b)(9) became effective ... courts continue to deal with litigation with respect to nearly
every part of the statutory language."
192. As discussed in much greater detail infra text accompanying notes 239-51, the
issue is whether the limitations that pertain to section 546(c) apply in connection with sec-
tion 503(b)(9). See also In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. at 415 ("There is no shortage of com-
mentary on the interplay of sections 503(b)(9) and 546(c).").
193. One commentator has urged that not only should the terms in the two sections be
interpreted with the identical meaning, but that the defenses available in section 546(c),
such as the prior lien defense, should also apply to section 503(b)(9) claims. Frederick J.
Glasgow III, Comment, Reclaiming the Defenses to Reclamation, 26 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J.
301, 303 (2010). The effect of doing so would be, for all practical purposes, to negate sec-
tion 503(b)(9) from having any impact except in a very narrow sliver of cases. See infra
note 197.
194. 455 B.R. 353, 355-56 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2011).
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pute that all of the shipments were made during this period and
conceded that the shipments under two of the invoices, for goods
received by the debtor in the twenty days preceding filing, were
entitled to administrative priority."' The debtor contested, how-
ever, the seller's entitlement to priority with respect to the other
four shipments-so-called "Drop Shipments"-made directly to
the debtor's customers, on the grounds that these goods were not
"received by the debtor" within the meaning of section 503(b)(9). 96
The court began its analysis by citing the axioms that the
words in any one statutory provision must be understood in rela-
tion to their context within the overall statutory scheme, and that
when Congress amends the bankruptcy laws it is assumed not to
effect major change without signaling such in the legislative his-
tory.' The court then observed that section 503(b)(9) was intro-
duced into the Code under a subsection of the same section of
BAPCPA that amended section 546, and noted the pre-BAPCPA
use of administrative priority to a reclamation claimant as an al-
ternative to recovery of the goods under former section
546(c)(2).'9" Based on this, the court concluded that sections
503(b)(9) and 546(c) "are related provisions that should be read
together.""' Proceeding from the proposition that section 546(c)
creates no independent federal rights, but simply allows a credit
seller to exercise her state law remedies subject to the additional
limitations imposed by the Code on the exercise of those reme-
dies,200 the court turned to the U.C.C.'s understanding of the term
"received" to conclude that the supplier could only assert an ad-
ministrative claim for those goods as to which the debtor had
physical possession or could be deemed in constructive possession
within the meaning of U.C.C. section 2-705(2).201 Inasmuch as the
195. Id. at 356.
196. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
197. Id. at 357. On this basis, the court accorded section 503(b)(9) a very narrow field of
operation, as essentially providing an alternative remedy for a seller entitled to reclama-
tion but for its failure to comply with the notice requirements of section 546(c)(1). Id.
198. Id. at 357-58.
199. Id.; accord In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 432 B.R. 225, 229 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
2010); S. Polymer, Inc. v. TI Acquisition, LLC (In re TI Acquisition, LLC), 410 B.R. 742,
745 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2009).
200. In re Momenta, Inc., 455 B.R. at 358 (citing In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. 409, 416
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
201. Id. at 359-60. U.C.C. section 2-705(2) terminates a seller's right to stop goods in
transit upon the happening of any one of four events. The first entails the buyer taking
possession of the goods. The remaining three involve possession through third parties that
are constructively deemed to be tantamount to possession by the buyer. See In re Wezbra
Dairy, LLC, 493 B.R. 768, 770-71 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2013) (holding that property was
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facts did not support constructive possession of any of the goods
subject to the drop shipments, the seller's administrative expense
was limited to the goods physically delivered directly to the debt-
202
or.
In contrast with Momenta, Inc. and similar authorities that
seem to read section 503(b)(9) as narrowly offering an alternative
remedy for reclaiming sellers,203 the bankruptcy court in In re
Erving Industries, Inc. took a very different view of the relation-
ship between sections 503(b)(9) and 546(c).20 4 In the main, the
case involved the appropriateness of a claim under section
503(b)(9) for the value of electricity supplied to the debtor during
the twenty days preceding filing.20 Consistent with the generally
accepted approach to the question,20 6 the court in Erving applied
the Article 2 definition of goods for purposes of interpreting the
scope of section 503(b) (9).20' However, unlike the conclusion
reached in some earlier cases,2 08 the court determined under that
deemed received upon acquisition of possession, irrespective of the location of title).
202. In re Momenta, Inc., 455 B.R. at 361. The court in Momenta, Inc. went on to con-
clude, in accord with most other decisions addressing the issue, that section 502(d) was
inapplicable to allowed administrative expense claims generally and to a supplier's admin-
istrative expense claim in particular. Id. at 364; accord ASM Capital, LP v. Ames Dep't
Stores, Inc. (In re Ames Dep't Stores, Inc.), 582 F.3d 422, 427 (2d Cir. 2009); In re Halabu,
No. 11-59449, 2013 WL 780757, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Mar. 1, 2013); In re Energy Con-
version Devices, Inc., 486 B.R. 872, 874, 878 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013); see also Michael
Ryan Diaz, Note, Disallowing Administrative Expenses Under Section 502(d): When
Claims Are Not "Claims" Under the Bankruptcy Code, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 397,
413 (2012) (agreeing with the majority of courts that administrative expenses are not sub-
ject to section 502(d)'s disallowance provision). But see In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 426
B.R. 560, 571 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2010) (holding that the goals of equitable distribution and
efficiency support the conclusion that section 502(d) may be used to temporarily disallow
section 503(b)(9) claims pending resolution of preference litigation); Cohen, supra note
180, at 267-68, 271 (arguing on policy grounds that section 502(d) should apply to all ad-
ministrative expenses, but, at a minimum, to section 503(b)(9) claims).
203. See 455 B.R. at 357-58; see also In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 416 B.R. 531, 536-
37 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2009) (concluding that section 503(b)(9) was adopted by Congress as
an attempt to enhance certain types of reclamation claims); Glasgow, supra note 193, at
304, 315, 339 (urging that section 503(b)(9) be read in light of section 546(c)).
204. 432 B.R. 354, 373 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010).
205. Id. at 356.
206. See, e.g., In re Grede Foundries, Inc., 435 B.R. 593, 594-95 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.
2010) (noting that, almost without exception, courts have looked to the U.C.C.'s definition
of "goods"); GFI Wis., Inc. v. Reedsburg Util. Comm'n, 440 B.R. 791, 797-98 (Bankr. W.D.
Wis. 2010) (holding that it is reasonable to apply the definition of goods provided by the
U.C.C. because courts often apply U.C.C. definitions when interpreting Bankruptcy Code
provisions).
207. In re Erving, 432 B.R. at 365-66.
208. In re Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 421 BR. 231, 239 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009); In re Sa-
maritan Alliance, LLC, No. 07-50735, 2008 WL 2520107, at *4 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. June 20,
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definition that the sale of electricity did constitute the sale of
goods for purposes of section 503(b)(9).20
Of greater moment for current purposes, however, is the court's
discussion of an alternative argument raised by the debtor; spe-
cifically, "that the meaning of goods under § 503(b)(9) should be
interpreted in relation to the reclamation provisions under §
546(c) and properly includes only goods that are capable of being
'stockpiled' by debtors and reclaimed by creditors."1 o This argu-
ment, the court mused, "goes too far and disregards the plain lan-
guage of § 503(b)(9)."211 The court refused, in other words, to read
the language of section 546(c)(2) as limiting in any way the right
to assert priority under section 503(b)(9) to those creditors who
might have qualified as reclamation sellers but for the failure to
make timely demand.212 Finally, the court dismissed the argu-
ment that placement of the reclamation amendments and the
2008) (stating that electricity is more properly characterized as a service). A number of
subsequent decisions have also adopted that view. E.g., In re NE Opco, Inc., _ B.R. _,
No. 13-11483, 2013 WL 5880660, at *12 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 1, 2013) (holding that be-
cause electricity is consumed almost at the same moment that it is identified to the con-
tract, it is not moveable and, thus, cannot qualify as a "good"); In re PMC Mktg. Corp., -
B.R. -, No. 09-02048, 2013 WL 4735736, at *6 (Bankr. D.P.R. Oct. 1, 2013).
209. In re Erving, 432 B.R. at 368; accord In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 12-10202
(ALG), 2012 WL 3879995 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2012); cf. In re Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co., 498 B.R. 19, 28-29 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (remanding bankruptcy court's determina-
tion that electricity is not a good for an evidentiary hearing as to whether electricity is me-
tered and consumed at the same time or, as logic dictates, there is a delay between identi-
fication and consumption); In re Plastech Engineered Prods., Inc., 397 B.R. 828, 839
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2008) (distinguishing natural gas from electricity).
210. In re Erving, 432 B.R. at 372 (footnote omitted).
211. Id. at 372-73.
212. Id. at 373; see also GFI Wis., Inc. v. Reedsburg Util. Comm'n, 440 B.R. 791, 802
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2010), wherein the court stated:
Finally, the bankruptcy court was correct to reject appellant's argument that
although the definition of "goods" is governed by the UCC, the term should be
limited to goods that are reclaimable. Congress added § 503(b)(9) to the
Bankruptcy Code as part of § 1227 of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act, entitled "Reclamation." Most of § 1227 is devoted to
amending § 546 of the Code to provide relief to sellers of goods who failed to
give an effective notice for reclamation. Appellant reads this as an indication
that § 503(b)(9) is a reclamation concept and suggests that goods must be re-
claimable in order for a seller to have a § 503(b)(9) claim. Appellant contends
that once electricity has been metered, it is consumed by the customer and is
no longer capable of being reclaimed.
The bankruptcy court rejected this argument, noting that § 546 does not
require that goods must be reclaimable to fall under § 503(b)(9) and at any
rate, electricity might well be reclaimable, as when it is stored in a bat-
tery.. .. I agree. Nothing in the language of § 503(b)(9) requires a claimant to
be entitled to a reclamation right under § 546.
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new priority in the same section of BAPCPA created any neces-
sary linkage between the two provisions, commenting that "the
sheer placement of sections of the public law cannot trump the
plain language of the Bankr:ptcy Code.""1
In In re Brown & Cole Stores, LLC, the Ninth Circuit Bank-
ruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court's holdings
that the section 503(b)(9) priority (in this case for in excess of $6
million for the twenty-day sales) extends to secured as well as
unsecured claims, and reversed the bankruptcy court's determi-
nation that the right of setoff did not apply to such claims.21 ' As to
the former point, the debtor argued that the amendment of sec-
tion 503(b)(1)(B)(i) in 2005 to clarify that the priority for any tax
incurred by the estate pertained whether the claim was "secured
or unsecured" implied that the absence of comparable language in
section 503(b)(9) should be understood as indicating Congress' in-
tent to limit the new administrative expense priority to unsecured
twenty-day claims.215 The majority opinion rejected the argument,
noting that section 503(b)(9) is unambiguous on its face and there
was no reason for the court to inquire "beyond its plain lan-
guage."2 16 Insofar as the right of setoff was concerned, the court
disagreed with the bankruptcy court that the element of mutuali-
ty was lacking simply because the claim against the estate was
an administrative expense claim. 217 To the contrary, the court
noted that what is critical in determining the applicability of sec-
tion 553(a) is not whether the claim against which setoff is sought
is an administrative expense, but rather whether the claim is a
pre or postpetition claim.2 " Because section 503(b)(9), unlike oth-
er administrative expenses, applies to prepetition obligations,
setoff should generally be permitted.2 19 Moreover, the majority
213. In re Erving, 432 B.R. at 373 (adopting the reasoning of In re Plastech, 397 B.R. at
838, that there is no basis to import a requirement that goods be reclaimable into entitle-
ment to priority under section 503(b)(9)).
214. Brown & Cole Stores, LLC v. Assoc. Grocers, Inc. (In re Brown & Cole Stores,
LLC), 375 B.R. 873, 875, 881 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007).
215. Id. at 877-78.
216. Id. at 878.
217. Id. at 878-79.
218. Id. at 879.
219. Id. (noting that the provisions of section 553(a), which do not apply to most admin-
istrative expense claims, do apply to twenty-day sales claims).
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opinion concluded that the debtor was not estopped, as the bank-
ruptcy court had held, from asserting the right of setoff "as a mat-
ter of equity."220
2. Analysis of the Section 503(b)(9) Case Law
Efforts to restrict the scope of section 503(b)(9) to a supple-
mental remedy available to the limited class of sellers who would
have been entitled to reclamation but for a minor noncompliance
with the notice requirement of section 546(c)(1) are as flawed as
the efforts to continue to define reclamation after BAPCPA by
reference to state law alone. Although the parade of evils both ef-
forts would avoid, if successful, is clear and present, in the long
run the harm resulting from the contrived and unnatural inter-
pretation of statutory language in order to accomplish those aims
is far more damaging to system values and integrity."'
With some exceptions, Erving and the majority opinion in
Brown & Cole Stores being among them, the courts largely have
done a creditable job since BAPCPA in preventing the adoption of
the new priority in section 503(b)(9) from undermining or unduly
interfering with core bankruptcy equality policies.222 There is,
however, a rub, and that is that the statute does not say, express-
ly or impliedly, what several of these reported decisions want it to
say (and which it perhaps even should say, but doesn't).222 The
urge to see in section 503(b)(9) a critical linkage with the right of
reclamation is understandable in light of the counterproductive
results associated with the elevation of potentially enormous
220. Id. at 879-80. The basis for the holding below was the debtor's failure to advise
the vendor that it was contemplating bankruptcy. The majority opinion of the Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel, however, correctly noted that there is no "duty to warn" creditors about
the possibility of an impending bankruptcy. Id.
221. If there is no deference to even a weak conception of legislative supremacy, and a
court is not restricted by statutory language, then a court can essentially make whatever
rule it wishes. This flouts the core principles of separation of powers and respect for the
rule of law. See Farber, supra note 9, at 284-88; see also supra notes 156, 158 and accom-
panying text.
222. This has been accomplished principally by artificially linking section 503(b)(9) to
the right of reclamation under section 546(c). See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying
text.
223. See In re Shat, 424 B.R. 854, 864 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010) ("[T]he starting point [in
statutory interpretation] is the presumption that Congress intended the accepted and
plain meaning of the words it used.").
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prepetition unsecured claims to administrative priority status,
but it is misguided.22 4
Consider Judge Jaroslovsky's separate opinion in Brown &
Cole Stores.22 5 He has no problem with the majority's setoff analy-
sis, 226 but argues for limitation of the section 503(b)(9) priority to
unsecured claims, noting a lack of clarity within the section itself
and a presumption that Congress acts intentionally when it in-
cludes specific language in one section of a statute but does not do
so in another.227 More fundamentally, however, the opinion focus-
es on the policy consequences implicated by the majority's deci-
sion; namely, the chilling impact on the prospects for reorganiza-
tion if a secured claim can also be granted priority status.228 To
avoid such a blow to reorganization prospects, Judge Jaroslovsky
urges that section 503(b)(9) be woven "into the tapestry of Ameri-
can bankruptcy law, preserving the clear intent of Congress to
protect recent suppliers of goods to debtors without unraveling
other provisions of the Code meant to facilitate reorganization."2 29
Unfortunately, while section 503(b)(9) may be a missed stitch
in the larger fabric of American bankruptcy law, Congress' intent
was anything but clear, and, on its face, section 503(b)(9) is not
limited to unsecured claims.230 In discussing policy considerations
224. See infra note 228 and text accompanying note 229.
225. In re Brown & Cole Stores, LLC, 375 B.R. at 881 (Jaroslovsky, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 881-82. Following the failure of the Circuit City Chapter 11, the House Ju-
diciary Committee conducted a hearing to determine why Chapter 11 could not save Cir-
cuit City. Several of the witnesses who testified at that hearing, including Professor Jack
Williams (appearing on behalf of the American Bankruptcy Institute) and Richard M. Pa-
chulski (Counsel to the Circuit City Creditors' Committee) identified section 503(b)(9) as a
primary culprit in the failure of Circuit City and other large retailer Chapter 11 cases.
Circuit City Unplugged: Why Did Chapter 11 Fail to Save 34,000 Jobs?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
25-26, 92-93 (2009) (statements of Richard M. Pachulski & Jack F. Williams).
229. In re Brown & Cole Stores, LLC, 375 B.R. at 882 (Jaroslovsky, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added); see also Glasgow, supra note 193, at 326
(agreeing with the dissent in Brown & Cole Stores that a creditor should only receive an
administrative claim to the extent that its secured claim is not fully secured).
230. See supra note 211 and accompanying text. Judge Jaroslovsky cites the canon that
Congress is presumed to act intentionally when it includes language in one section-in
this instance section 503(b)(1)(B)(i)-but not another section, in this case section 503(b)(9).
In re Brown & Cole Stores, LLC, 375 B.R. at 881 (Jaroslovsky, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). By the same token, however, one must assume that Congress acts in-
tentionally when it amends the language of a single provision-in this case section
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and his concern for reorganization, Judge Jaroslovsky acknowl-
edged that allowing priority to a secured creditor may not have a
big impact in Chapter 7.231 This is almost certainly true. Not to be
lost sight of, however, is the fact that, as applied to unsecured
creditors, the impact of section 503(b)(9) in a liquidation context
can be just as disruptive as it is in Chapter 11, since its effect is
to elevate one type of unsecured claim over all others in direct
contravention of one of the primary goals and central policies of
the Bankruptcy Code; namely, "equitable distribution" or
"[e]quality of distribution among creditors."m' Whether and why
recent unsecured suppliers of goods are more worthy than other
unsecured vendors, or ought to be treated as such, are questions
fairly open to debate. If, however, the basis for special solicitude
is concern over debtors "loading up" in anticipation of filing,233 the
way in which the Code typically deals with other creditors who
are the victims of opprobrious debtor conduct, such as fraud or
defalcation, is by exclusion of that claim from discharge, not mak-
ing other unsecured creditors pay the price for the debtor's perfi-
dy.234 Nonetheless, there are, as discussed earlier,"' other justifi-
cations for the favored treatment, 236 as well as other situations
where the Code balances the equality principle against competing
546(c)(2)-from providing a particular kind of relief as an alternative remedy, to saying
that the remedy is not affected by entitlement to the other form of relief. See infra note
241.
231. In re Brown & Cole Stores, LLC, 375 B.R. at 881 (Jaroslovsky, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
232. See, e.g., McCafferty v. McCafferty (In re McCafferty), 96 F.3d 192, 196 (6th Cir.
1996) (discussing the foundational nature of the equality principal); In re Plastech Engi-
neered Prods., Inc., 394 B.R. 147, 151 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2008) (suggesting that, without
explanation or rationale, Congress violated "the bedrock policies of the Bankruptcy Code"
to provide uniform and equal treatment to similarly situated creditors).
233. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
234. Many of the exceptions to discharge, such as those in sections 523(a)(2) & (4), are
animated by types of misconduct that, like most of the grounds for general denial of dis-
charge in Chapter 7, would deprive the debtor of membership in the "honest-but-
unfortunate" debtor family. See Lawrence Ponoroff, Vicarious Thrills: The Case for Appli-
cation of Agency Rules in Bankruptcy Dischargeability Litigation, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2515,
2540 (1996).
235. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
236. Most notable among them being to avoid financial distress from triggering an in-
evitable slide into bankruptcy. See AMERICAN BANKR. INST. COMM'N TO STUDY THE
REFORM OF CHAPTER 11 (May 21, 2013) (testimony of Sandra Schirmang, Sr.), available at
http://commission.abi.org/sites/default/files/statements/21may2013/SandraSchirmang-Tes
timony.pdf; infra note 269 and accompanying text.
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policy objectives.2 37 While the particular federal interest that dic-
tates priority for credit sellers may not be readily apparent, it is
the incontrovertible effect of section 503(b)(9) to grant such prior-
ity regardless of its interference, if not conflict, with both bank-
ruptcy rehabilitation and equality policy."'
It is also true that the effort to temper the impact of the new
administrative priority by linking it to section 546(c), as the Mo-
menta, Inc. court and others have done,2 39 helps limit the damage
to important policy interests that would otherwise result. But is
there really any principled basis on the language of the statute to
support the effort? In Momenta, Inc., citing to revised section
546(c)(2), the court observed that section 503(b)(9) provides a
seller who did not comply with the notice requirements of section
546(c)(1) "an alternative remedy to reclamation."2 40 In fact, how-
ever, it does no such thing. Subsection (c)(2) simply says the fail-
ure to comply with the notice requirements of section 546(c)(1)
does not affect a claimant's rights under section 503(b)(9). It does
not say only creditors who, but for their failure to give timely no-
tice under subsection (c)(1) would have a valid reclamation claim,
are eligible to assert a claim under section 503(b)(9).2 41 Indeed,
fairly read, the language of subsection (c)(2) is a testament to the
fact that the two sections of the Code are independent of one an-
237. See supra note 190.
238. See Bruce, supra note 174, at 197-200.
239. See In re Momenta, Inc., 455 B.R. 353, 357-60 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2011); see also su-
pra text accompanying notes 197-200.
240. In re Momenta, Inc., 455 B.R. at 357.
241. Once more, section 546(c)(2) begins with the word if, not when, a seller fails to
provide the notice contemplated by section 546(c)(1). On appeal of the bankruptcy court's
decision in Momenta, the seller pressed the argument that Congress could not have in-
tended section 503(b)(9) to protect only reclamation sellers since (1) section 546(c) by its
terms contemplates sellers, who are not entitled to reclamation, but who may still pursue
relief under section 503(b)(9), and (2) a section 503(b)(9) claimant need not show that the
debtor still possesses the goods-an "essential" requirement of a reclamation claim. Ning-
bo Chenglu Paper Prods. Mfg. Co. v. Momenta, Inc., No. 11-cv-479-SM, 2012 WL 3765171,
at *5-6 (Bankr. D.N.H. Aug. 29, 2012). The court credited the argument as "plausible"
which it surely is, but then concluded that the same factors equally suggest Congress's
more "focused" intent to provide a supplemental remedy for sellers that, but for a minor
deficiency, would have qualified for reclamation under section 546(c). Id. In all truth, how-
ever, the second of the two points relied upon by the seller does no such thing, and, of
course, if that were Congress's intent, why did the focus shift from sales made in the ordi-
nary course of the seller's business to those made in the ordinary course of the buyer's
business?
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other, and should be so construed.24 2 In addition, the ordinary
course of business limitation appears in both sections, but not in a
consistent fashion. Section 546(c)(1) relates to transactions made
in the ordinary course of the "seller's business," whereas section
503(b)(9) refers to "goods . . . sold to the debtor in the ordinary
course of such debtor's business."242 The distinction is not without
potentially significant consequence in terms of a non-professional
seller's rights under, respectively, the two Code sections. All of
this points up that, under any sort of plain meaning approach,
sections 546(c) and 503(b)(9) cannot be understood as related,
other than in the sense they deal with similar (but not identical)
kinds of claims.
This conclusion draws additional support when one considers
the applicability of the prior lien defense to an administrative ex-
pense claim under section 503(b)(9). It has been argued with
great force in a thoughtful student comment that "[w]here the
prior lien defense would prevent a reclaiming seller from exercis-
ing his § 546(c) reclamation rights, this restriction should also
prevent a seller from being granted an administrative expense
under § 503(b)(9)."2 44 This is, it may be recalled, a version of a
similar issue that arose under former section 546(c)(2) regarding
the impact of a prior lien on a reclaiming seller's entitlement to
an administrative priority or a secured claim.245 In any event, the
author urges that an "absurd result" is reached if a reclaiming
seller that is foreclosed from recovering the goods by the explicit
subordination in revised section 546(c)(1) to a prior lien is none-
theless allowed to receive an administrative expense claim equal
to the value of the exact same goods.246 In support of this con-
struction, the author points to Judge Lifland's decision in In re
242. In other words, section 546(c)(2) used to say, in essence, you can be given an ad-
ministrative claim in lieu of the goods. After BAPCPA, it effectively says that even though
you do not qualify as a reclamation seller, you may still recover under section 503(b)(9).
243. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 546(c)(1) (2012) (emphasis added), with 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9)
(2012) (emphasis added).
244. Glasgow, supra note 193, at 321.
245. See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
246. Glasgow, supra note 193, at 321. The author supports his argument with a clever
analogy to the analysis employed by the Ninth Circuit in Bonner Mall P'ship v. U.S. Ban-
corp Mortg. Co. (In re Bonner Mall Partnership), 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993), a case explor-
ing whether the new value exception to the absolute priority rule under the former Bank-
ruptcy Act survived enactment of the Code in 1978. Glasgow, supra note 193 at 326-38.
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Dana Corp.,247 agreeing with the debtors' contentions that the
"prior liens ... rendered all of the reclamation claims value-
ess3248less.
It is important, however, to point out two things about the
opinion in Dana Corp. First, while the court does note that
BAPCPA has resolved the conflict among the courts concerning
whether a reclaiming seller must be granted an administrative
claim or a lien on property of the debtor's estate pursuant to for-
mer section 546(c)(2) when the goods in question are subject to
the claim of a prior lienholder with a superior interest,24 9 the deci-
sion does not indicate in exactly whose favor that resolution has
been decided.250 Second, the court had this to say in relation to
section 503(b)(9):
The issues before the Court today relate solely to the Prior Lien De-
fense to reclamation rights under section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy
Code and not to the rights to an administrative expense under the
newly enacted section 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code. This new
provision presents other issues concerning, inter alia, the valuing of
the subject goods; what constitutes the actual receipt of the goods;
how is the claim asserted; when is it to be paid; is it subject to the
claims processing and omnibus bar date orders, etc.? These issues
will not, and need not, be parsed here. Suffice it to say that in light
of the section 503(b)(9) amendment, section 546(c) is no longer an ex-
251
clusive remedy for a prepetition seller.
While it may be peculiar that a seller who cannot reclaim goods
under revised section 546(c), because of the existence of a prior
security in those goods, may be able to obtain an administrative
claim for the value of those goods (or at least some of those
goods), it is submitted that precisely that result is the better and
most faithful reading of the Code after BAPCPA.2 52 If that result
is untenable, the solution is legislative correction, not judicial in-
vention. Moreover, by calling attention to the fact that section
247. Glasgow, supra note 193, at 307-08; In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. 409 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2007).
248. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. at 411.
249. Id. at 415 n.5.
250. In other words, the "resolution" could be that a seller whose reclamation claim is
barred by the prior lien defense now is provided with an administrative expense claim un-
der section 503(b)(9), at least with respect to goods delivered to the debtor in the twenty
days prior to commencement of the case.
251. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. at 411-12 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
252. Recall that the look-back periods in the two statutes are not coincident. See supra
note 139 and accompanying text.
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546(c) is "no longer an exclusive remedy for a prepetition seller,"
Dana Corp. seems to support that very reading, as opposed to one
that restricts section 503(b)(9) to circumstances where reclama-
tion would be available but for the failure to make timely de-
mand. When the discretion to grant an administrative expense
was part of the reclamation statute, as was true prior to
BAPCPA, it made perfect sense to understand entitlement to the
alternative relief as hinging on the existence of an otherwise valid
reclamation claim. Now, however, since the right to an adminis-
trative expense claim is disjoined from the reclamation statute
(other than to make clear in revised section 546(c)(2) that compli-
ance with the requirements of section 546(c)(1) does not defeat a
claim under section 503(b)(9)), it is far more dubious to maintain
that position. That is to say, it is simply implausible to assert
that a defense to one remedy somehow impliedly serves as a de-
fense to what the court in Dana Corp. properly described as a
separate, independent remedy for eligible prepetition sellers.m
Finally, this analysis draws added support from the fact that eli-
gibility for relief under the two remedies is different: reclamation
of goods sold in the ordinary course of the seller's business with a
forty-five-day look-back from the date of demand under section
546(c)(1), versus priority for the value of goods acquired by the
debtor in the ordinary course of the debtor's business and deliv-
ered within twenty days prior to the commencement of the case.
In sum, there is simply no basis in the Code after BAPCPA to
construe section 546(c) as limiting or controlling in any way the
rights of a claimant under section 503(b)(9), and ample reason to
regard them as independent of one another.
III. TOWARD A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
It is without question that revised section 546(c) and section
503(b)(9), when applied in accordance with their evident and sen-
sible meanings, seriously encroach upon established bankruptcy
rehabilitative and equality policies, at least as those polices were
understood up to 2005. This fact has undoubtedly had a signifi-
cant and understandable impact on the case law, as has been
seen. And yet, it is equally true that many of the consumer provi-
sions in BAPCPA have gone well beyond "abuse prevention" and
253. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. at 411-12.
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impinged, perhaps just as unwisely, on an equally core bankrupt-
cy value; namely, the fresh start principle.254 That alone, however,
is not justification for courts to refuse or confound application of
clear rules in order to minimize the deleterious impact. The fact
is that public policy, as expressed in legislation, is not static and
does change over time. Likewise, a complex legal regime like
bankruptcy simultaneously advances multiple policy goals that
must be and are constantly balanced and adjusted against one
another. Necessarily, the relative strength of any one such value,
like "fresh start," will change over time. The "established" policies
of today are not necessarily those of tomorrow. One may not agree
with particular changes,"' but, unless they are constitutionally
infirm, democratic process demands that they not be ignored. All
public policy is imperiled when that occurs in any single instance,
no matter how defensible the decision to do so in that particular
case because of what is perceived as a danger to paramount sys-
tem values. This is a fundamental tenet of perhaps the most sali-
ent value of all; namely, respect for a legal regime premised on
the rule of law and correlative appreciation of the truth that re-
spect for that value demands the strictest adherence when it is
least convenient and comfortable to do so.256
254. This is reflected in a variety of places throughout the Code, including means test-
ing in section 707(b); the elimination of "ride through" under sections 521(d) and 362(h);
the limitations on strip-down in section 1325(a) (the so-called "hanging paragraph"); ex-
emption restrictions in section 522(p); and many, many more. See generally Nuvell Credit
Corp. v. Westfall (In re Westfall), 599 F.3d 498, 501-02 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing AmeriCredit
Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Long (In re Long), 519 F.3d 288, 294 (6th Cir. 2008)) (stating that there
is little doubt that the architects of the hanging paragraph in section 1325(a) intended on-
ly good things for auto lenders); Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 in Transition-From Boom
to Bust and into the Future, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 375, 388 (2007) (calling BAPCPA an ill-
conceived special interest victory that has "effectively repealed the fresh start principle for
individuals"). The point being that "fresh start" is neither a formal legal status nor a cog-
nizable legal right, but rather an aspiration of the system that will over time wax and
wane in importance when weighed against other goals of the system, such as wealth max-
imization, abuse prevention, etc. See Ponoroff, Vicarious Thrills, supra note 234, at 2519-
20.
255. In the interests of full disclosure, I am certainly willing to go on record with my
antipathy toward many of the changes to bankruptcy law wrought by BAPCPA.
256. Justice Douglas expressed it well in his dissenting opinion in the Regional Rail
Reorganization Act Cases:
If the rule of law under a moral order is the measure of our responsibility, as
I have always assumed, we can only hold that the Rail Act of January 2,
1974 ... undertakes to sanction a fraudulent conveyance, as those words
were used ... in our Bankruptcy Act. I have been reluctant so to conclude,
implicating as it does our legislative branch in a lawless maneuver of gigantic
proportions. But, baldly put, the present law is a tour de force to that end.
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It is certainly possible, as has been seen, to read limitations in-
to section 503(b)(9) that do not exist, and to construe the en-
hanced reclamation remedy so as to be applicable in only very
limited circumstances."' Such efforts, however, arguably exceed
the permissible boundaries of judicial authority under almost any
recognized understanding of our constitutional structure of gov-
ernment.' Much more troubling is the fact that, even if one could
concoct a theory of statutory interpretation to support them,
these efforts also have a nasty unintended fall-out.259 That is, they
blunt or mask the worst consequences of BAPCPA, but they do
not by any stretch of the imagination eliminate them. That may
be beneficial in the short-run, but like an analgesic that tempo-
rarily dulls the pain from an injury, it also allows us to muddle
along without addressing the root of the problem, and perhaps
even exacerbates that problem. This cannot be a positive thing for
the long-term health of the bankruptcy system or our system of
justice. The stronger, but far more distasteful, medicine would be
to bow to the unambiguous command of the legislature, however
quixotic. The howl and outlandish results that would follow if the
new rules are as unsound as they seem to be might even cause
the affected interest groups to pressure Congress to deal with the
issue in a far more guileless and effective manner than occurred
in 2005; that is, amendment of the statute to unscramble an egg
that probably never should have been broken in the first place.
419 U.S. 102, 162 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
257. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
258. See IUE-CW v. Visteon Corp. (In re Visteon Corp.), 612 F.3d 210, 220 (3d Cir.
2010) ("It is for Congress, not the courts, to enact legislation. When courts disregard the
language Congress has used in an unambiguous statute, they amend or repeal that which
Congress enacted into law. Such a failure to defer to the clearly expressed statutory lan-
guage of Congress runs contrary to the bedrock principles of our democratic society."); see
also Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 538 (2004) (quoting United States v. Locke,
471 U.S. 84, 95 (1985)) ("Our unwillingness to soften the import of Congress' chosen
words ... results from 'deference to the supremacy of the Legislature . . . .'); United
States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 68 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("It is beyond our
province to rescue Congress from its drafting errors, and to provide for what we might
think, along with some Members of Congress, is the preferred result."). Even Justice Brey-
er, who probably takes the broadest view of the judicial role in statutory interpretation,
has acknowledged that the freedom judges have to consider statutory language in light of
the statute's basic purpose is circumscribed in the first instance by the answers supplied
through the existence of clear text or the canons of interpretation. See Fla. Dep't of Reve-
nue v. Picadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 55, 59 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
259. See supra note 156 (concerning the difficulties of doing so).
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The groups that surely would spearhead such an effort are not
among the disempowered or those without influence. They are the
groups with the greatest access to, and loudest voices in, the sys-
tem. While nothing short of utter frustration by the interest
groups that clamored for the means test over its ineffectiveness in
actually increasing bankruptcy payouts is likely to result in the
repeal or revision of section 707(b), the same is not true with re-
spect to vendor claims under sections 503(b)(9) and 546(c).2 60 The
proponents and opponents simply do not line up along the same
lines as the proponents and opponents of the consumer "abuse"
provisions of BAPCPA.2 6' The issues surrounding credit seller
claims are almost purely inter-creditor issues.
At least in the current political environment, it seems clear
that a return to the ancien rigime is not in the offing.2 62 This, in
and of itself, is not necessarily disturbing, as the differing consid-
erations implicated in and outside of bankruptcy may make it
equally imprudent to reflexively conclude that the Code should do
(as it earlier did) no more than afford a seller the opportunity to
take advantage of any reclamation right that might exist under
state law, if indeed that is how former section 546(c) operated.2 63
After all, we all bow to Butner, but, in truth, the principle articu-
lated in Butner represents no more than a bias.264 By definition,
then, it applies more often than not, but it is not an absolute that
substitutes for reasoned analysis in each instance where federal
and state law intersect.2 65 The efficient operation of a system of
260. See Carslon, supra note 4, at 227 (suggesting that not only has the means test not
produced bigger payouts, but in fact may have actually contributed to abuse of the sys-
tem).
261. See supra note 6 (compiling citations that take the view that the well-funded and
organized consumer credit lobby won the battle over BAPCPA at the expense of the over-
whelmed individual consumer).
262. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 55, 63 and accompanying text for discussion of the fact that a dis-
connect existed between section 546(c) and the state law right of reclamation existed from
the very start.
264. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1979) (articulating that a creditor's
rights, entitlements, and priority in assets of the bankruptcy estate are determined under
state law).
265. In addition to the obvious circumstances where a federal interest predominates,
such as in connection with the trustee's avoiding powers, there are any number of areas
where the bankruptcy courts must balance a creditor's state law rights with the debtor's
federal law equitable right to a "fresh start" or to have the opportunity to reorganize. See,
for example, Coleman Oil Co. v. Circle K Corp. (In re Circle K Corp.), where, in the context
of permitting the debtors to exercise an option to renew without first assuming a lease and
curing prepetition defaults, the court noted:
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bankruptcy laws is in and of itself an overriding federal interest,
such that the exception to the Butner principle is one that can
overcome the rule in virtually any situation."' It is with that in
mind, and recognizing that section 503(b)(9) provides at least as
much, if not more, protection than U.C.C. section 2-702(2),m that
it is submitted a more principled and efficacious approach would
be to: (1) eliminate any reference whatsoever to reclamation
claims under section 546(c), thus permitting the trustee the op-
portunity to challenge any prepetition reclamation of goods under
section 545 or otherwise, and negating any postpetition claims to
physically recover goods; and (2) retain a modified version of the
current administrative expense priority for twenty-day claims.268
But all kinds of interferences with contractual rights occur in bankruptcy
proceedings. Section 365(a) permits a debtor to reject an executory contract or
unexpired lease altogether, which wholly contravenes the contract or lease as
written. The automatic stay in bankruptcy frequently prevents the enforce-
ment of contracts according to their terms. We have held that a bankruptcy
debtor may cure a default and avoid the termination of a contract even if the
contract does not allow for cure. .. . Thus no principle of bankruptcy or con-
tract law precludes us from permitting the Debtors here to extend their leas-
es in a manner contrary to the leases' terms, when to do so will effectuate the
purposes of section 365.
127 F.3d 904, 910-11 (9th Cir. 1997). Similarly, in In re NM Holdings Co., the court, rely-
ing on Sixth Circuit precedent regarding the scope of section 105(a), rejected the creditors'
argument that the Butner principle deprived the court of authority to order substantive
consolidation. 407 B.R. 232, 271, 273, 276-77 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2009). The court noted
there is an overriding federal interest in the equitable and efficient distribution of a debt-
or's property among its creditors, and, in the case of conflict with state property law, bank-
ruptcy policy must prevail. Id. at 277; see also Brady-Morris v. Schilling (In re Kenneth
Allen Knight Trust), 303 F.3d 671, 678-79 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting In re Arehart, 52 B.R.
308, 310 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985)) (stating that whether an entity is eligible for relief un-
der Title 11 is purely a question of federal law, such that the definition of a "business
trust" is properly made as a matter of federal, not state, law); Wolters Vill., Ltd. v. Vill.
Props., Ltd. (In re Vill. Props., Ltd.), 723 F.2d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 1984) (observing, in dicta,
that the equities of a case may permit a bankruptcy judge to deviate from state law);
Levitin, supra note 161, at 68 (arguing that there can be a federal common law in bank-
ruptcy based on the language of the Bankruptcy Clause in the Constitution, the legislative
history of the Code, pre-Code practices, and the nature of bankruptcy practice); cf. R. Ben-
jamin Hanna, Note, Federalism in Bankruptcy: Relocating the Doctrine of Substantive
Consolidation, 96 MINN. L. REV. 711, 713 (2011) (arguing that principles of federalism
should be invoked to limit the application of substantive consolidation).
266. See supra note 159 for discussion of the Butner principle.
267. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9) (2012) (allowing administrative expenses for "the
value of any goods received by the debtor within 20 days before the date of commencement
of a case under this title in which the goods have been sold to the debtor in the ordinary
course of such debtor's business"), with U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (2013) ("Where the seller discov-
ers that the buyer has received goods on credit while insolvent he may reclaim the goods
upon demand made within ten days after the receipt .... ).
268. There seems to be a growing consensus among vendors that, particularly since
BAPCPA, the combination of the growth in secured debt and the manner in which the case
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Presumably, the possibility that bankruptcy might be avoided
entirely is worth "something" in terms of a preferred position for
trade creditors that take the risk of continuing to do business
with the financially wobbly debtor.' If this is so, then that policy
of encouraging vendors to continue to deal on open-credit terms
with buyers in the shadow of bankruptcy is best served by some-
thing more reliable, certain, and less cumbersome than a recla-
mation claim.2 70 For example, if it is to serve its purpose, this
remedy should not fail based on the serendipity of whether the
goods are still in the debtor's possession or on the existence vel
non of claimants with a superior interest-factors not easily
known or inexpensively discovered by unsecured sellers. In short,
the reclamation remedy does represent a very powerful incentive
to encourage extension of open account credit to distressed debtor
companies.
By the same token, a rule that sensitively implements this ob-
jective should not be one that provides absolute hegemony to the
credit seller of goods over either the necessity for retention of the
goods at issue for a successful reorganization or the interests of
other creditors. In failing to balance dexterously these competing
considerations, revised section 546(c) has introduced enormous
cost, ambiguity, and uncertainty into the process with very mea-
ger corresponding return benefit. This is not to say former section
546(c) was much better. It is to say that reclamation in its ortho-
dox state law sense has little to offer in bankruptcy, and particu-
larly not in the reorganization context, where it might not only
undermine the reorganization effort, but also work an inequity on
law has developed has served to negate reclamation as a meaningful remedy for unsecured
trade creditors. See, e.g., AM. BANKR. INST. COMM'N TO STUDY REFORM OF CHAPTER 11
(May 21, 2013) (testimony of Sandra Schirmang, Sr.), available at http://commission.abi.
org/sites/default/files/statements/21may2Ol3/SandraSchirmangTestimony.pdf.
269. As noted supra in the text accompanying notes 186-90, there is currently some
uncertainty regarding the purpose behind section 503(b)(9). Although, in my view, this is
the most compelling justification for special treatment of eve of bankruptcy credit seller
claims, the first step in fashioning a revised version of the statute is, of course, to identify
which justification is most salient. The difficulty (or irony) with the rationale of encourag-
ing vendors not to shut off credit is that one can only identify the cases where the aim
failed and, in a systematic way, can never know how many debtors, if any, were actually
able to avoid bankruptcy as a result of this incentive.
270. Even though section 503(b)(9) does not preempt the possibility for payment to crit-
ical vendors, this point is particularly important given the narrowing of the bankruptcy
courts' authority to permit payment of prepetition claims under the doctrine of necessity.
See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
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other prepetition sellers and creditors who would have no reason
to be aware of what amounts to a secret lien against assets of the
estate.
Nonetheless, if the legislative judgment is that there are sound
bankruptcy policy reasons to treat open account sellers that deal
with the debtor on the eve of bankruptcy (however defined) with
special solicitude should a proceeding ensue, then the preference
ought to be crafted in a fashion that most effectively and yet fair-
ly accomplishes that goal. That requires, initially, clear identifi-
cation of the justification(s) for favored treatment in the first
place, which might include not only the desire to encourage ven-
dors to do business with a struggling debtor, but also to police
and rectify opprobrious conduct by debtors in loading up on open
account claims in anticipation of bankruptcy.' Next, it calls for a
rule carefully constructed and designed to serve these objectives
with minimal limitations, conditions, and exceptions. Unlike sec-
tion 546(c), the administrative expense priority in section
503(b)(9) is unequivocal on its face and, for the most part, free
from what might be described as nettlesome qualifications. That
may, then, represent a start. However, the statutory priority in
its current form is also fairly open to criticism in circumstances
where the allowance of such claim may have a disproportionately
negative impact on other equally important goals of the system.
Furthermore, to avoid a "doubling up" by a seller of goods, the
priority would also need to make provision for a successful pre-
filing reclamation of some or all of the twenty-day goods that, for
whatever reason, is not avoidable.272
This leads to the suggestion that we decide first who is in the
class of prepetition open account vendors who are to receive the
favored treatment. Perhaps it is ten- rather than twenty-day
claimants, or perhaps its twenty-day claimants but with a dollar
cap.2' There is no absolute right and wrong here, it is merely a
political (and, if possible, empirical) judgment where to draw the
271. If the latter is the primary rationale, there is some question whether a priority
claim is the best (or fairest) solution. See infra note 284 and accompanying text.
272. See Bruce, supra note 174, at 200 (pointing out that a seller whose claim qualifies
under section 503(b)(9) might also enjoy double recovery by asserting a reclamation claim).
273. An example of this approach is contained in section 502(b)(6), which governs the
allowability of lessor claims arising from termination of a long-term lease. 11 U.S.C. §
502(b)(6) (2012).
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line so as to get it "about right" more often than not. Simply for
discussion purposes, let us assume that the best accommodation
is to apply the rule to goods received by the debtor in the ordinary
course of the debtor's business within ten days prior to the com-
mencement of the case.274 Next, to assure to the degree possible
that the assertion of this claim does not work more mischief than
good, it is necessary to build some play into the joints of the sys-
tem by investing bankruptcy judges with the kind of discretion
that existed under former section 546(c)(2). That is, to permit
courts to order that a lien be granted on property of the estate, so
as to allow for deferred payment of the present value of the ad-
ministrative claim in a plan of reorganization, in lieu of full pay-
ment of the claim in cash at or prior to the time of confirmation.2
For this to make sense would also require that the statute be
crafted to overrule the holding in Brown & Cole Stores such that
rights under the administrative expense priority would be limited
either to wholly or partially unsecured ten-day claims.276 This
would prevent, in an appropriate case, realization of the concerns
forcefully articulated by Judge Jaroslovsky in his separate Brown
& Cole Stores opinion.27' The amended version of section 503(b)(9)
might thus read as follows:
(b) After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed administrative
expenses ... ,including-
(9) a claim for the value of any goods received by the debtor
within 10 days before the date of commencement of a case un-
der this title in which the goods have been sold to the debtor in
the ordinary course of the debtor's business, but only to the ex-
tent such claim-
274. If the principal rationale for an administrative expense priority is to encourage
open account sellers to continue to do business with the debtor, then the issue of whether
these sales are in the ordinary course should be assessed from the debtor's perspective, as
in current section 503(b)(9), but unlike section 546(c)(1). Alternatively, if the principal
concern is loading up by the debtor before filing, then the focus might appropriately shift
to ordinary course as determined from the seller's perspective. See supra note 188.
275. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (2012).
276. Brown & Cole Stores, LLC v. Associated Grocers, Inc. (In re Brown & Cole Stores,
LLC), 375 BR. 873, 875 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007).
277. See supra notes 225-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of Judge Jaroslov-
sky's opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
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(A) is not secured by an otherwise unavoidable security
interest, and
(B) the debtor did not on account of such claim make an
otherwise unavoidable transfer to or for the benefit of the
claimant.27
This amendment does not resolve all of the questions that have
arisen under current section 503(b)(9),2 7 9 nor is it intended to do
so. Rather, the aim is to assure a meaningful remedy that will
serve the objective of encouraging suppliers and vendors to deal
with a debtor teetering on the precipice of bankruptcy without
giving away the store to that creditor (and, in the process, seri-
ously impairing the interests of other creditors) should that effort
to avoid a bankruptcy filing prove unavailing. 28 0 That in place,
subsidiary issues concerning the scope of the remedy, all of which
can never be anticipated in advance anyway, must and can be re-
solved in the typical common law fashion and are best left to that
281process.
278. I am not unmindful that, to a certain degree, this would produce a result in most
cases not dissimilar from the result reached in the cases that held an otherwise valid rec-
lamation could not be denied because of the existence of a prior lien, unless the relief con-
templated in former section 546(c)(2) of either administrative expense priority or security
was awarded. See supra text accompanying notes 78-82.
279. Several issues, including the meaning of "received," whether utility services can
constitute a "good" and application of section 502(d) to section 503(b)(9) claims, have pre-
viously been discussed. See supra text accompanying notes 90-93, 176, 204-08. Judge Li-
fland identified a number of other such questions in In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. 409, 411-
12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). Since Dana Corp., additional questions have arisen, such as:
(1) the relationship between section 503(b)(9) and the courts' ability to order payment of
"critical vendor" claims under the doctrine of necessity; and (2) whether the value of goods
subject to a section 503(b)(9) claim can be excluded from the subsequent new value defense
of section 547(c)(4). See e.g., In re 0 & S Trucking, Inc., No. 12-61003, 2012 WL 2803738,
at *2 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. June 29, 2012); In re Commissary Operations, Inc., 421 B.R. 873,
878 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2010); Nick Sears, Comment, Defeating the Preference System: Us-
ing the Subsequent New Value Defense and Administrative Expense Claims to "Double
Dip," 28 EMORY BANxR. DEv. J. 593, 607 (2012). A number of other issues are addressed in
Gage, supra note 180, at 245-80.
280. This would be true regardless of whether the case was filed under Chapter 7 or 11,
since the administrative expense priority conflicts with key policy aims in both situations.
See supra text accompanying notes 229, 231-32.
281. By and large, except insofar as there is a genuinely identifiable federal interest,
which might support a federal common law, many of these derivative issues will be re-
solved by reference to state law. See Ponoroff, Exemption Limitations, supra note 134, at
240-41 n.93 (discussing the growing "federalization" of commercial law). See generally Jay
Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 585
(2006) (discussing areas where federal law continues to operate after Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). When the administrative expense claim must be paid may
well fall in the realm of federal common law. As for other issues, once more, clear identifi-
cation of the purpose for the priority payment might well control. For instance, if the prof-
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Just as this proposal does not resolve every issue relating to
what are now being called ten-day claims, neither is there any-
thing sacrosanct about this particular approach to the problem. It
is merely intended to be illustrative of one, of what are surely
many, avenues for addressing the most troubling issues created
by BAPCPA's treatment of credit seller reclamation and related
claims.282 For example, instead of providing flexibility by giving
the courts discretion to provide security in lieu of the administra-
tive claim, the statute could be crafted to invest the courts with
authority to delay payment of prepetition administrative claims
until sometime after the plan effective date."8 Alternatively, if the
principal policy justification for priority is predicated on policing
bad faith stockpiling by debtors, rather than creating incentive to
keep the debtor afloat, perhaps proof of intent, aided or not by a
presumption, should be an element of entitlement to the priority
in one form or another.284 Whatever the final product, it needs to
represent a far more sensitive and discriminating approach than
what has been accomplished by the relevant provisions of
BAPCPA. Specifically, it needs to tailor more providently the con-
tours of a special credit seller priority in certain situations, on the
one hand, without compromising unduly foundational bankruptcy
rehabilitation and equality policies, on the other.
CONCLUSION
The judicial role of common law courts in statutory cases has
been the subject of endless debate. 288 However, even the propo-
fered rationale of avoiding the interruption of open account credit is accepted, then it may
well be that state law ought not provide the rule of decision over when goods are "re-
ceived," as has currently been the rule. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 278 (addressing some of the other unresolved issues).
283. Currently, the effective date of the plan represents the outside date for payment.
See supra note 183; cf. In re Vertis Holdings, Inc., No. 12-12821, 2012 WL 6560343, at TT
7-16 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 30, 2012) (noting that payment of section 503(b)(9) claimants
does not have to be assured as a condition to approving either postpetition financing or use
of cash collateral). Other alternatives might include a lower level of priority, rather than
administrative expense status, that might allow for payments to the accepting class to be
deferred with interest. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(B) (2012).
284. Alternatively, if the anti-stockpiling rationale is the main concern, perhaps ad-
ministrative expense priority is not the right solution at all. See supra note 188 and ac-
companying text. However, if the priority is maintained, then the focus probably ought to
shift back from sales in the ordinary course of the seller's business to transactions in the
ordinary course of the debtor's business. See supra note 188.
285. See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Statutes in Common Law Courts, 91 TEX. L. REV. 479
(2013) (reviewing some of this debate); see also Lawrence Ponoroff, The Dubious Role of
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nents of the most permissive and discretionary vision of statutory
interpretation recognize that when statutory text provides clear
answers it ought to be given effect.286 Concessions might be made
for legislation that is dated, or where contemporaneous expres-
sion of legislative intent renders the otherwise clear text ambigu-
ous, or where there has been a quantum alteration in the social,
legal, or economic environment in which the statute operates.
None of those exceptions can fairly be said to appertain to
BAPCPA generally, or to the changes wrought by BAPCPA in the
case of credit seller claims in particular. Surely, there are aspects
of revised section 546(c), and even section 503(b)(9), that are less
than clear and require interpretation."' Likewise, there are as-
pects of the interaction of those provisions with other provisions
of the Code that need explication, and here courts play a vital
role.288
That said, there are other key components of both of these
statutory edicts that, while logically disturbing, leave little if any
room for interpretation. It is also beyond serious quarrel that sec-
tions 546(c) and 503(b)(9) represent separate remedies, each with
its own panoply of non-congruent requirements, limitations, and
conditions.288 The efforts that have been made to temper the most
disquieting of these consequences in relation to bankruptcy reha-
bilitative and equality policies are commendable in motive, but
ultimately difficult to defend on a principled basis. In the long-
run, they do not reflect well on the viability and virtue of a
healthy bankruptcy regime. Thus, and with reluctance, it is pro-
posed, initially, that the courts accept the changes that BAPCPA
has brought about with respect to eve-of-bankruptcy credit seller
claims; the damaging result to perceived larger system values
notwithstanding. It is then submitted that if the emperor truly
has no clothes, this can and should lead to a more-or-less nonpar-
tisan effort by affected interests to push Congress to craft an ap-
proach to such claims that calibrates, adjusts, and accommodates
the multiple constituencies with a stake in the issue in a far more
Precedent in the Quest for First Principles in the Reform of the Bankruptcy Code: Some
Lessons from the Civil Law and Realist Traditions, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173, 180-81 (2000)
(critiquing the role of courts as part of the cause in bringing about need for reform of the
Code).
286. Supra note 9.
287. Supra notes 251, 278 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 134.
289. Supra Part II.B.2.
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discerning and adroit fashion than that which it preceded. This
approach is messy and time-consuming, but it is also how our
tradition of law and justice operates best. For illustrative purpos-
es, one, of what undoubtedly are of several, alternatives for ac-
complishing this goal of corrective legislation has been proposed.
Ultimately, however, the best solution is the one that will have
been forged and honed in the furnace of honest and dispassionate
debate.

